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Introduction
Bishop Pierre-Daniel Huet (1630-1721) enjoyed an eminent career for a
seventeenth-century scholar. Huet was born in Caen to a family of Protestant converts to
Catholicism and rose to become one of the most respected intellectual figures of his age.
He was appointed as the assistant tutor to the dauphin in 1670. Four years later he was
elected to the Académie française. In 1686 he was appointed Bishop of Soissons, though
his post was later transferred to Avranches. Huet had a productive scholarly career,
having published the Traitté de l’origine des romans (Treatise on the Origin of Romances
– 1670), the Demonstratio Evangelica (Proof of the Gospel – 1679), the Censura
cartesianae philosophiae (Critique of Cartesian Philosophy – 1689), the Alnetanae
quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei (Alnetian Questions Regarding the Agreement
between Reason and Faith – 1690), and the Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l'histoire
du Cartésianisme (New Memoirs to Serve the History of Cartesianism – 1691) in addition
to other minor but erudite works.
Despite his extensive scholarly accomplishments and contemporaneous renown,
Huet likely would have been forgotten by subsequent generations were it not for the
posthumous publication of his skeptical treatise, Traité philosophique de la faiblesse de
l'esprit humain (A Philosophical Treatise Concerning the Weakness of Human
Understanding – 1723). Most of those who considered Huet a friend were startled and
unsettled by his explicit embrace of philosophical skepticism. The views articulated in
the Traité seemed so distant from those expressed in Huet’s earlier works that some of
his contemporaries erroneously argued that he could not have written the skeptical
treatise. This was particularly true of Huet’s Jesuit friends, who were startled by its
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heretical content and asserted that the work was a forgery. 1 The tension between the
author’s likely intentions and the reception of his work raise a number of revealing and
historically significant questions. How could Huet, given his deep religious commitment
to Catholicism, have written such a heterodox and heretical work? If his objective was
not to undermine but to sustain orthodoxy and to preserve the faith from the assaults of
reason, why was he so misunderstood by his colleagues?
Historians have addressed the subject of Huet’s skepticism tangentially, but very
little scholarship is dedicated solely to Huet’s intellectual world and itinerary. Most of
Huet’s works remain untranslated, and most of his correspondence is still unpublished.
While there are two biographies and a number of articles devoted to analyzing Huet’s
thought, no books in modern intellectual history are devoted entirely to Huet’s
skepticism. Richard Popkin, generally recognized as the leading authority on the history
of skepticism, has written several articles comparing Huet to other skeptics of the
seventeenth century. Thomas Lennon has translated Huet’s Censura cartesianae
philosophiae and has written articles on the nature of Huet’s skepticism. Lennon argues
against Popkin’s classification of Huet as a “complete Pyrrhonian skeptic,” 2 offering a
more moderate interpretation of Huet’s Traité. 3 While these historians have offered valid
interpretations of Huet’s skepticism, their analyses have neglected to trace carefully the
evolution of Huet’s thought through correspondence and other unpublished materials.
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Thomas M. Lennon, “The Skepticism of Huet’s Traité philosophique de la foiblesse de l’esprit Humain,”
in Scepticisme et modernité, ed. Marc André Bernier and Sébastien Charles, (Saint-Etienne: Université de
Saint-Etienne, 2005), 68.
2
Richard H. Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism, (San Diego: Austin Hill, 1980), 21.
3
Lennon, 65-75.
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April Shelford provided one important exception to this tendency in her Faith and
Glory: Pierre-Daniel Huet and the Making of the Demonstratio Evangelica (1679),
published in 1997 as a Ph.D. dissertation. She offers new evidence indicating that Huet
was committed to philosophical skepticism much earlier than most scholars have
suggested. Shelford’s dissertation is the first major historical work that is concerned
specifically with Huet’s intellectual trajectory. Her dissertation places Huet within his
educational context and interprets his place in it. More importantly for this thesis,
Shelford’s work incorporates a variety of primary sources, exploiting correspondence and
manuscripts that are difficult to access. Due to the abundance of primary sources cited in
Shelford’s work, her dissertation has been a crucial source for this thesis, not so much for
her interpretation of Huet’s skepticism as for the primary evidence and contextual
analysis to be found there. 4
Huet is also worthy of further investigation because he bequeathed a vast library
filled with his own marginalia. 5 These notes reveal Huet’s private reactions to the texts
that influenced his intellectual development. In order to gauge these privately expressed
ideas, this thesis will analyze Huet’s marginalia and the manuscript versions of some of
his published works. Such unpublished sources reveal a more personal side of Huet,
allowing for a reconsideration of the assumptions underlying the evolution of his
skepticism. Thus, this thesis will attempt to reconcile Huet’s published works, including
4

While Shelford does describe Huet’s early commitment to skepticism, she is more concerned with
studying the Humanist aspects of Huet’s works. Since she is concerned with Huet as a member of a
scholarly community, the Traité is not her central concern.
5
Huet left his library to the main convent of the Jesuit order in Paris. His 9,000 volume library was
purchased by the royal library of Louis XV in 1765. Most of his books are now at the Resereve of the
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, identifiable by the engraving Ex libris bibliothecæ quam Illustriss.
Ecclesiæ Princeps D. Petrus Daniel Huetius, Episcopus Abrincensis Domoi professæ Paris. PP. Soc. Iesu
Integram Vivens Donavit, anno 1692. For more on the history of Huet’s library see: Charles Urbain, “La
Bibliothèque de P. Daniel Huet Évèque d’Avranches,” in Bulletin du Bibliophile et du Bibliothécaire, 1910,
(Paris : Librairie Henri Leclerc), 133-146.
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his memoirs, with his private correspondence and manuscripts in order to resolve the
tensions between his private and public images and to understand the development of his
skepticism.
Since Huet remains such an understudied and misunderstood thinker, a historical
investigation of the development of his thought provides a number of benefits for an
intellectual historian of the seventeenth century. A reinterpretation of Huet’s skepticism,
taking advantage of the sheer number of unconsulted primary sources, such as marginalia
and manuscripts, should make possible an improved understanding of Huet’s intellectual
development. Further, the scarcity of contemporary scholarship on Huet invites new
questions about the early-modern trends and debates. A study of lesser-known thinkers
often reveals more about the intellectual trends of a period than studies of “canonical”
authors, because the former may tend to be more representative of contemporaneous
opinions.
While Huet does not figure in the modern canon of early-modern European
thought, he was an influential thinker during the seventeenth century and was not
forgotten during the Enlightenment. The eighteenth century's most influential skeptic, the
Scot David Hume, began his celebrated and notorious Dialogues Concerning Natural
Religion with a reference not to the ancient Greek skeptics, but to Huet's skeptical work.
Remarkably, scholars devote little discussion to Huet’s place in Hume’s Dialogues, in
which Cleanthes, the interlocutor defending natural philosophy, describes Huet as “a man
of the most extensive learning, who wrote a demonstration of Christianity, [and who] has
also composed a treatise, which contains all the cavils of the boldest and most determined
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Pyrrhonism.” 6 Cleanthes next states that John Locke was “the first Christian, who
ventured openly to assert, that faith was nothing but a species of reason.” 7 The curious
leap from Huet to Locke reveals a certain tension in early-modern thought. On the
surface, the fideistic skepticism of Huet appears incompatible with Locke’s view of faith.
For Huet, faith was the only source of certainty to which man’s feeble reason must
submit. However, Hume’s presentation of these authors may indicate his own
understanding of the relationship between skepticism and empiricism. Hume’s Cleanthes
perceives an intellectual progression from Huet’s assault on reason to Locke’s
classification of faith under the realm of reason. Where Huet weakened the human
reliance on reason, Locke unavoidably undermined the reliance on faith by arguing that it
is inseparable from reason. Thus, for Hume’s interlocutor, the combination of skeptical
arguments and empirical reasoning was dangerous, leading to the undermining of faith.
While this is not necessarily Hume’s own view, Cleanthes’ argument certainly presents a
perspective contemporaneous to Hume, whose use of this perspective reveals the tensions
between Huet’s intentions and the effects of his philosophical skepticism. Hume’s use of
Huet also demonstrates the latter’s presence in the Enlightenment.
Given Huet’s influence on the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, his
philosophy deserves more careful scrutiny than it has so far received. If we engage in a
historical investigation of the responses to Huet’s Traité and the origins of his skeptical
thought, we will understand better the ways in which Huet and those around him
perceived the relationships between human and divine knowledge, between scientific
evidence and faith. The study of Huet’s intellectual context will reveal the continuity
6

David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Richard H. Popkin (Indianapolis, Cambridge:
Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), 10.
7
Ibid.
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from his earlier works to his skeptical treatise, disclosing much about the world whose
dilemmas and tensions produced such a seemingly eclectic thinker. Furthermore, we will
better understand why both Huet’s contemporaries and modern historians have been so
mystified by his legacy.
Scholars too often classify philosophers in falsely rigid ways that gloss over
thinkers’ individual differences. Thus, the term “skeptic” itself must be placed in its
historical context. The word has a loose set of connotations for a modern reader.
However, ancient and early-modern philosophical schools of skepticism are associated
with strictly defined sets of arguments regarding the nature and limits of claims of
knowledge, truth, and certainty. These skeptical movements were by no means
monolithic, but instead varied in place and time, depending on the intellectual worlds and
debates around them. Consequently, the investigation into the nature and origins of
Huet’s skepticism must consider the intellectual context of seventeenth-century France,
one that gave birth to the most diverse set of skeptical thinkers in early-modern Europe.
It is impossible to understand this skeptical revival without considering the
history of the intellectual movement. The origins of the skeptical philosophy derived
from ancient Greece, when thinkers developed various arguments to establish one of two
general claims: that no certain knowledge was attainable, or that there was insufficient
evidence to determine if any such knowledge was attainable. 8 The former view is called
Academic skepticism, while the latter is known as Pyrrhonian skepticism.
Academic skepticism aimed to demonstrate that any dogmatic proposition (a
proposition that claimed certainty about the real nature of things) could not be verified

8

Popkin, The History of Scepticism: from Savonarola to Bayle, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003), xvii.
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with absolute certainty. “Dogmatic” schools suggested that the perception of an object by
the senses guaranteed its real existence outside the world of human perception. The
Academics claimed that the evidence of any proposition would be based on either sense
perception or reasoning and argued that both faculties were unreliable. Since no human
faculty was capable of verifying that human knowledge about the real natural world was
accurate, the Academics argued that nothing was certain and that all knowledge was only
probable. 9 While complete certainty could not be attained, a degree of probability could
be established such that some propositions would contain more certainty than others. This
school of thought derives its name from the Platonic Academy, where it was formulated
in the third century B.C.E. “from the Socratic observation ‘All I know is that I know
nothing.’” 10 The formulation is attributed to Arecesilas (c. 315-241 B.C.E.) and
Carneades (c. 213-129 B.C.E.). It was passed down to the medieval and early-modern
periods in Cicero’s Academica and Saint Augustine’s Contra Academicos. 11
The Pyrrhonian school derives its origins from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360-275 B.C.E.)
and his student Timon (c. 315-225 B.C.E.). Considering both the dogmatists and the
Academics to be extreme, the Pyrrhonians proposed to suspend judgment on all questions
that seemed to rely on conflicting evidence. For them, skepticism was a state of mind, not
a commitment to a particular philosophy. Indeed, for Pyrrhonians, the proposition that
nothing could be known with certainty, if drawn out to its full conclusion, would have to
include itself. Thus, nothing could be known with certainty, including the proposition that

9

Ibid., xvii-xviii
Ibid., xvii
11
Ibid.
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nothing could be known with certainty. A Pyrrhonian skeptic would then achieve a state
of ataraxia – peace of mind or quietude. 12
The basic surviving text of Pyrrhonian skepticism, generally called the Outlines of
Pyrrhonism, had been written by Sextus Empiricus around 200 C.E. in Alexandria.
Sextus also composed the Adversus mathematicos, in which he subjected logic,
mathematics, astrology, and grammar to skeptical refutations. Unlike Academic
skepticism, which influenced the Middle Ages through the filter of St. Augustine’s (354430) attempted refutations, Pyrrhonian skepticism remained virtually unknown until the
rediscovery and Latin publication of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism in 1562. 13
Prior to the sixteenth century, Academic skepticism had been the sole source of
skeptical arguments, but the rediscovery of Sextus Empiricus allowed various
reformulations of skeptical philosophy. Further, the exact source of skeptical arguments
becomes difficult, if not impossible, to determine, because many such arguments were
formulated or utilized merely to refute dogmatic claims rather than to construct new
philosophical systems.
Toward the end of the sixteenth and the first half seventeenth centuries,
skepticism became particularly influential in France because of the impact of the writings
of Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592). His Apologie pour Raimond Sebonde, published in
his Essais (Essays – 1580), is generally considered to be the first major early-modern
presentation of Pyrrhonian thought. However, Montaigne revealed the influence of both
Pyrrhonian and Academic schools, because he followed both Sextus Empiricus’
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Ibid., xix.
José Maia Neto, “Academic Scepticism in Early Modern Philosophy,” Journal of the History of Ideas 58
no. 2 (1997), 198-199.
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exposition in presenting forms of ancient skepticism and also frequently cited Cicero’s
Academica. 14
Montaigne himself divided philosophers into “dogmatists, Academics, and
Pyrrhonians.” 15 He found Pyrrhonian doubt to be more radical and more coherent than
Academic doubt and stressed the intellectual, moral, and religious advantages of
Pyrrhonian ataraxia. 16 He urged that it was “better to remain in suspense than to get
engaged in so many errors that human fantasy has produced.”17
Montaigne’s synthesis of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism extends to three
main realms of human knowledge: natural philosophy, theology, and humanist
scholarship. 18 In the domain of natural philosophy, Montaigne’s skeptical outlook
questioned the reliability of sense perception, the truth of first principles, the availability
of a criterion of truth, and the reliance on appearances for formulating positive statements
about the real nature of things. Montaigne’s exposition of these difficulties raised doubts
about the possibility of discovering true and certain facts about the world.
Montaigne’s version of these arguments foreshadowed and influenced further
skeptical challenges to traditional views in natural philosophy. In the mid-seventeenth
century, both Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) and Marin Mersenne (1588-1648) formulated
new epistemological and ontological systems, classified by most modern historians of
skepticism as “mitigated skepticism.” Both used skeptical arguments in order to
undermine Aristotelian scholasticism (and, in some cases, Cartesianism), and both then

14

Ibid., 201.
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid., 202 quotes Michel de Montaigne, Essays, Book II, Essay 12.
18
Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 55.
15
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established natural philosophies that relied on empirical observations and expressed
limited claims about the probable nature of things.
Montaigne’s exposition also contained a significant religious dimension. The
fifteenth-century Spanish theologian Raimond Sebonde (c. 1380-1436) had asserted that
all the articles of the Christian religion could be proven by natural reason. The main
objection to this claim was the argument that the most essential articles of Christianity
were based on faith and not on rational arguments. Montaigne’s defense was an
underhanded refutation. He first presented a theory of Christianity that relied exclusively
on faith and then attempted to demonstrate that all reasoning was unsound, showing that
Sebonde should not be blamed for his theoretical errors. 19 Montaigne did not oppose the
use of reason to support the faith, but he concluded that faith did not depend on any
human arguments. 20 Consequently, any rational claim made to support the faith had to
assume, in Montaigne’s view, the truth of divine revelation.
Montaigne himself abided by the Pyrrhonist view that skeptics should accept
established laws and customs. Thus, he accepted the Catholic faith as a cultural default of
his particular time and place. He criticized Catholics for subjecting some of their
doctrines to doubt and urged his Catholic readers to “either submit completely to the
authority of our ecclesiastical government, or do without it completely.” 21 Because
Montaigne considered human knowledge to be uncertain, he argued against Protestant
attempts to challenge polemically the Catholic articles of faith.

19

Ibid., 47.
Ibid., 48.
21
Montaigne, Essays, in The Complete Works of Montaigne, trans. Donald M. Frame, (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1958), 134.
20
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This was a crucial statement in the context of Reformation and CounterReformation currents of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One of the main tenets
uniting Protestant sects was the principle of scriptura sola, “by Scripture alone.”
Protestants claimed that all the truths of the Christian religion should be understood from
Scripture alone. Consequently, they initially argued that interpretive authority beyond
Scripture was superfluous, since each believer could arrive at an individual understanding
of truth by reading the Bible. This argument directly challenged the Catholic reliance on
the doctrinal interpretation of the Church, and it led Catholic apologists such as Francisco
Suarez (1548-1617) to assert that Scripture was not as clear as the Protestants had argued
and could only be understood with the aid of the inspired authority of the Church. 22 Thus,
some Catholics referred to skeptical arguments to undermine the Protestant view of
Biblical interpretation and to preserve orthodoxy.
Montaigne’s formulation of Christian Pyrrhonism was expanded in the
seventeenth century by his disciple, the priest and philosopher Pierre Charron (15411603). Charron combined skeptical arguments with the main anti-rationalist currents in
Christian theology to provide a solid basis for a Christian Pyrrhonism. In Les Trois
Véritez (The Three Truths – 1594), Charron argued that God’s existence and God’s nature
could not be known to man because of “our weakness and the greatness of God.” 23 Since
natural human knowledge was irreparably limited, it could never understand an infinite
being. Thus, Charron argued that God was unknowable for two reasons: because He was
infinite, and because man was incapable of knowing anything with certainty.
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Pierre-François Moreau, “Les arguments sceptiques dans la lecture de l’Ecriture sainte,” in Le
scepticisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle: Le retour de philosophies antiques à l’Age classique, Tome II, ed.
Pierre-François Moreau, (Paris: Albin Michel, 2001), 386.
23
Popkin, The History of Scepticism, 58.
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Consequently, man had to rely on faith in revelation and on the Church’s interpretation of
Scripture. Like Montaigne, Charron attempted to show that Christianity was the true
religion and that the Catholic Church represented its true formulation.
Finally, Montaigne’s skepticism reveals the “humanistic crisis of knowledge”
ironically generated by the rediscovery of new schools of ancient thought. 24 Popkin
argued famously that the increased availability of ancient perspectives precipitated a kind
of learned skepticism, as humanists, faced with a diversity of opinions, found themselves
unable to determine a conclusively superior theory. 25 Montaigne’s Essays combined a
variety of ancient theories with presentations of cultures of the New World to suggest that
human opinions and cultures were relative to time, place, and circumstance.
Montaigne’s skepticism had a profound influence on the seventeenth century not
only because of its successful popularization, but also because of its far-reaching
intellectual implications. 26 His outlook did not exclusively address natural philosophy or
theology, but echoed what is known as la crise Pyrrhonienne (the Pyrrhonian crisis) in
the intellectual life of Europe. Thus, Montaigne both reflected and propagated anxieties
about the nature of knowledge and certainty on the eve of the intellectual revolution
about to transform European culture.

24

Ibid., 55.
Ibid.
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scepticisme, métaphysique, théologie, eds. Vincent Carraud, Jean-Luc Marion, Jocelyn Benoist et al. (Paris:
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In order to comprehend fully the impact of the skeptical revival in the seventeenth
century, we must understand that it was by no means a uniform intellectual movement in
its formulations and goals. In general, skeptical movements in seventeenth-century
France can be divided into two broad categories. The first category of skeptics included
figures such as Mersenne and Gassendi, who intended to establish new philosophical and
scientific systems while taking into account the limits of human knowledge. As will be
shown in the first chapter, these skeptics voiced dissatisfactions with the Aristotelian
Scholasticism that permeated European universities at the beginning of the seventeenth
century. These philosophers generally used skeptical arguments in order to undermine
established philosophical views and to advance new epistemological outlooks.
The second category, represented by thinkers such as François de La Mothe Le
Vayer (1588-1672), Simon Foucher (1644-1696), and Pierre Bayle (1647-1706),
appeared in the second half of the seventeenth century and employed skepticism for
primarily religious reasons. Contrary to the crise Pyrrhonienne, this second wave of
skepticism emerged to counter the mid-century revolution in natural philosophy.
Struggling to preserve traditional theology from the onslaught of rational criticism, these
thinkers attempted to elevate the status of faith in supernatural revelation and to show that
human reason was neither capable of nor responsible for a rational approach to religious
questions. This latter school of thought is often called “fideist.”
The combination of skepticism and religious belief may seem counterintuitive to
modern readers, for whom skepticism is generally associated with religious doubt and
disbelief. To avoid this anachronism, we must consider skeptical fideism within its
appropriate historical context. Such an investigation should reveal the origins of this

13

intellectual movement and improve the historical understanding of the intentions of its
proponents.
This study will not only show how Huet fits into the second category of fideistic
skeptics, but it will also evaluate his attitudes and opinions in the intellectual context of
the seventeenth century. It will demonstrate how a Huet, educated according to the most
traditional curricula, became, in the eyes of his contemporaries, so opposed to the aims of
his educational system. That opposition, this thesis will argue, was an invention of Huet’s
contemporaries reacting to his skeptical treatise and does not accurately reflect Huet’s
philosophical and theological viewpoints. Finally, this investigation will examine Huet’s
intentions in composing this work and explain why these intentions were so
misunderstood by his contemporaries. Consequently, Huet’s reasons for not publishing
the Traité during his lifetime will become clear.
The thesis will be divided into three chapters. The aim of the first chapter is twofold. First, it will describe Huet’s intellectual world, presenting both the structure and
content of his education. It also will expose the general philosophical trends in
seventeenth-century France that influenced the formation of Huet’s thought. It will give
particular attention to Huet’s own opinions regarding these trends, utilizing his
correspondence and his memoirs. Second, the chapter will introduce Huet’s Traité
philosophique de la faiblesse de l'esprit humain, analyzing the actual nature of Huet’s
skeptical arguments.
The second chapter will demonstrate in detail the nature of René Descartes’s
(1596-1650) vital influence on the formation of Huet’s skepticism. It will consider how
divergent epistemologies led the two thinkers to formulate drastically different views

14

about the abilities of human reason. The chapter will establish the relationship between
Huet’s skepticism and his anti-Cartesianism, showing that these philosophical positions
are interdependent for Huet. In addition, it will discuss modern interpretations of Huet to
situate this thesis within contemporary debates.
The third chapter will address the religious dimension of Huet’s skepticism. It
will present Huet’s view of the proper relationship between faith and reason and situate it
among the tensions and debates of seventeenth-century theology. The chapter will
consider the rational strain of Christianity as exhibited by the proofs of the existence of
God offered by both the Aristotelian scholastics and the Cartesians. It will juxtapose this
rationalist theology with the fideistic strain of Christianity, presented in the arguments of
Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), La Mothe Le Vayer, and Pierre Bayle. Finally, the chapter
will explain why Huet chose not to publish his treatise during his lifetime.
Seventeenth-century debate over the scope and limits of human knowledge, seen
in bold relief in the case of Pierre-Daniel Huet, changed the thinking and, eventually, the
curriculum of European civilization. Understanding the contexts, dilemmas, and
evolution of Huet's thought sheds essential light on a crucial aspect of this process of
deep, and even revolutionary, conceptual change. It clarifies what was occurring
historically in a Europe whose mental life was being forever altered by the debates in
which Huet was a central participant, a framer of issues for others, and a lightning rod for
those uneasy or, indeed, alarmed about what was occurring among those who would
teach the next generations of a learned culture that had already transformed Europe's
understanding of what it was to know and what was out there to be known.
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Chapter 1: The Unintended Consequences of a Traditional Education
Pierre-Daniel Huet’s skeptical philosophy can be analyzed within the framework
of Montaigne’s three realms of human knowledge: theology, natural philosophy, and
humanist study. Like Montaigne, Huet was a devout Catholic, who saw in skepticism the
perfect path to the acceptance of revelation. Huet also deeply questioned the possibility of
attaining any certainty by means of natural philosophy. Finally, Huet’s humanist
erudition led him to reject traditional philosophical systems and eventually to accept a
skeptical outlook toward all human opinions.
This chapter will describe Huet’s development as a skeptic in the context of his
education in natural philosophy and his humanist endeavors in the world of Biblical
exegesis. We will begin by considering Huet’s seventeenth-century education. In
presenting Huet’s intellectual evolution we will reveal the origins of his skepticism. We
will then examine the content of Huet’s skeptical treatise to describe the exact nature of
his skepticism.
***
Huet began his studies at the Jesuit collège de Mont Royal in Caen. The Jesuit
curriculum, formally outlined in the Ratio atque institutio studiorum societatis Iesu
(Method and System of the Studies of the Society of Jesus – 1599), entailed a combination
of two three-year cycles of instruction in philology and philosophy. Students began with
the humanities, comprised of an intensive course of Latin grammar and rhetoric, and then
moved on to study philosophy in the second cycle. The goal of such an education was to
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produce orthodox apologists for the Catholic cause in response to the Protestant
Reformation of the sixteenth century. 1
Thus, before considering his education in philosophy, we will address Huet’s
humanist background and present its manifestation in Huet’s own work. The fundamental
aim of the humanities course was to produce learned students fluent in both written and
spoken Latin. 2 Latin was the language of science, philosophy, and theology, uniting
learned Europe with a universal medium of communication. The Jesuits believed that
classical Latin presented the best linguistic model and used writers such as Ovid, Catullus,
Virgil, Horace, Livy, Sallust, Caesar, and Propertius. Following the model of Quintilian,
the Jesuits held poetry to be extremely useful in the development of rhetorical skills. 3
Thus, students were instructed in Latin rhetoric and grammar by both classical poetry and
prose.
A Jesuit student was expected to perform extensive Biblical exegesis. Training in
Greek was deemed essential to real erudition, because it was the original language of the
New Testament. 4 Thus, humanistic study of ancient literature and rhetoric was crucial to
the formation of a student who could cogently argue on behalf of Catholicism. Cyprian
Soarez (1524-1593) argued in his De arte rhetorica (Concerning the Art of Rhetoric –
1562) that training in rhetoric essentially taught the student how to think because reason
and rhetoric were so deeply intertwined. 5
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The instruction was not only linguistic, but also moral, providing classical models
for imitation. The understanding of pagan culture would improve the morality of the
students and enhance their understanding of the Bible. 6 Readings were chosen for their
ability to reinforce the similarity between Christian values and the ancient examples of
virtue. Thus, by coming in contact with Latin and Greek texts, students encountered
various accounts of European history and mythology. 7
For some students, interest in the content of such ancient works surpassed the
didactic value of linguistic lessons. For instance, Huet saw the study of languages as a
tool and not as an end, because he came to consider himself an erudite first and foremost:
I am aware that this study has its use, and even necessity and that a correct knowledge of
antiquity, which is the best part of polite literature, cannot be obtained without the aide of
those tongues which were spoken by the nations who have transmitted to us the arts and
sciences…but let them be regarded as handmaids, who are courted only as leading the
way to their mistresses, which are the branches of knowledge themselves. Thus,
languages are the keys by which the doors of learning are to be opened, and those who,
content with the possession of them, stop at the threshold, and do not penetrate to the
recesses, may be resembled to janitors, who, bearing the keys to many apartments,
themselves sleep out of doors. 8

Thus, perhaps contrary to its intentions, by exposing students to a vast spectrum of
ancient texts Jesuit education promoted a spirit of erudition that often went beyond
supplementing exegetical skills.
Huet left Caen in 1652 to accompany his mentor Samuel Bochart (1599-1667) to
Sweden and the Netherlands. Huet made use of the many libraries he encountered during
his voyage. In Denmark he visited Tycho Brahe’s astronomical laboratory and in Sweden
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he found the manuscript of Origen’s Commentary on St. Matthew. Having copied the
commentary in Sweden, Huet edited and translated it until 1668. 9
Such a textual exercise was one of the most basic tasks of a humanist scholar. It
involved the restoration of the text to its original form, providing a translation if the
original were not in Latin, and composing a commentary on the primary text. Philological
expertise in ancient languages was necessary, but an understanding of the particular
historical and cultural contexts of the texts was equally crucial to revealing their meaning.
The editor also had to be familiar with all of the references in the text and thus had to
attain a copious knowledge of diverse subjects. In other words, he had to possess
erudition. 10
Indeed, Huet sought to attain a professional level of Biblical exegesis and would
surpass many of his peers. He went beyond studying Latin and Greek and tried to learn
Hebrew in order to read the Old Testament in the original. Bochart assisted Huet in
improving his Greek and beginning his study of Hebrew. Bochart also stressed the
importance of Hebrew in his own Geographia sacra (The Sacred Geography – 1646),
claiming it was the first language, from which all others were derived. In upholding the
spirit of humanism, Bochart also claimed that the interpreter had to know the meanings of
proper names in the Bible, had to master geography and history in Scripture and in pagan
texts, and had to learn the astronomical significance of prophecies. 11
Bochart’s Geographia sacra similarly guided Huet to formulate his own research
interests. Huet composed a work on a similar subject in his short Traité de la situation du
paradis terrestre (Treatise Concerning the Location of the Terrestrial Paradise – 1691).
9
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Bochart’s methodology also proved extremely influential on Huet. In undertaking this
work, Bochart sought to discover the location of the Garden of Eden and to prove that
Biblical geography was insufficiently known. He also proposed to discover the origins of
the first people. Although Bochart suggested that ancient mythologies resembled fables,
he believed that they could accurately confirm the Biblical account of history. Bochart
sought to “correlate diverse ancient sources with the Bible” to support this claim. He
demonstrated similarities between the Bible and pagan sources, such as the Orphic hymns
and the works of Ovid, Hesiod, Teleclidus, Martial, Plato, Plutarch, and Macrobius. Thus,
Bochart sought to synthesize the copious data he amassed in order to prove that the Bible
did indeed provide a complete record of human history, thereby pronouncing the
universality of the Christian religion. 12
Bochart followed in the humanist tradition that, beginning in the fifteenth century,
integrated ancient mythology, Neo-Platonic, Kabbalistic, and Pythagorean philosophies
into the framework of Christian Revelation. The basis of this synthesis lay in the belief
that the most pure form of Christian theology was passed directly from God to Adam and
was later disseminated and diluted among the ancient peoples.13 The desire to reconcile
what appeared to be authentic ancient sources with the Bible was a logical one for erudite
believers. Such a synthesis could ease the tensions created by apparent historical
discrepancies between the Bible and pagan sources.
Huet confessed in his memoirs that he did not finish his work on Origen because
he was “deterred by the magnitude of an obscure task” and because he was contemplating
“a work of more splendour,” that he “conceived, much more useful to the Christian
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cause.” 14 This work was his Demonstratio Evangelica. Although Huet began with an
attack on the certainty of geometric principles, he combined moral axioms taken from
Scripture with a structure of a geometric proof:
I imagined a new path might be struck out, different from the trodden ones, but certain
plain, and direct, leading to a demonstration of that truth, not less clear and indubitable
than the argumentative processes of geometricians, who boast that they do not persuade
but compel conviction. 15

This combination was similar to one used by Philippe du Plessis Mornay’s (15491623) De la Vérité de la Religion Chrestienne (Concerning the Truth of the Christian
Religion – 1581). Mornay argued that the truth of Christianity could be proved using a
method that resembled a geometric proof. He claimed that just as geometers had to accept
certain axioms before engaging in geometrical proofs, basic principles could be equally
established for the demonstration of religious truths. These principles were “God’s
existence, beneficence, power, and omniscience; the immortality of the soul…and need
for divine grace.” 16 Mornay considered these truths to be universal and believed that
from them man could arrive at “certain and indubitable” deductions.17
Despite its confident approach, Mornay’s method failed to prove, for most readers,
that the truth he sought rested in Christianity. Christian revelations were particular, not
universal. Therefore, a reliance on faith in revelation was necessary before any of
Mornay’s principles could be accepted. 18 Huet acknowledged the influence of Mornay
but also voiced his disappointment with the proof:
I particularly expected much from Philip de Mornai (du Plessis)… But, Good God! How
were my hopes deceived! I found vain and futile arguments, ancient testimonies collected
14
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at random, and either misunderstood, or unfaithfully quoted, and errors without
number. 19

Unlike Mornay, Huet was writing after the authenticity of the Old Testament had been
subjected to historical scrutiny. In his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (Theological and
Political Treatise – 1670), Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) questioned the Mosaic
authorship of the Bible, thereby significantly undermining the historical reliability of
Scripture. Huet perceived Spinoza as an “unlearned” man who possessed no expertise for
composing Biblical criticism. He argued that Spinoza borrowed most of his arguments
from Isaac La Peyrère (1596-1676) and Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).20
In the Prae-Adamitae (Men Before Adam – 1655) La Peyrère suggested that the
absence of various peoples from Biblical accounts, and the inconsistency between
Biblical chronology and that of the Chinese, signaled the fact that the Bible was solely an
account of Hebrew history and that Adam was not the first man, but the first Jew. 21 Such
an argument undermined both the universality of Christianity and the historical value of
the Bible. These objections forced Huet to consider essential issues of textual authenticity.
Huet began his positive proof by providing an ordered set of definitions for the
following terms: “authentic book,” “contemporary book,” “history,” “prophecy,” “true
religion,” “Messiah,” and, finally, “Christian religion.” 22 Like a true humanist, Huet
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believed the authenticity of the texts to be an essential indicator of their historical value.
Like Bochart, Huet sought to consult both pagan and Christian sources, and he “resolved
to pass no work on the same topic, whether ancient or modern, without examination.” 23
Huet similarly aimed to synthesize these accounts:
We will demonstrate that those earliest Gods and Heroes of the peoples, whomsoever
were worshipped throughout nearly the whole world, [and] indeed similarly the many
founders and legislators and all the theology of the Pagans followed either from Moses
himself or from the acts of Moses or from his writings. 24

Huet’s insatiable quest for knowledge was evident from his earliest years as a student. He
confessed how he was often mocked by his peers for his overly studious nature, and how
these insults only invigorated his passion for learning. 25 Thus, Huet serves as a typical
example of a humanist of his generation. His intellectual curiosity grew proportionally to
the number of texts he discovered, driving him to an inexorable quest for certainty and
concordance among these sources, a certainty he never attained.
While the Demonstratio Evangelica represented the efforts of a humanist and a
Biblical exegete, it also revealed Huet’s interest in geometry. In the following chapter we
will address the anti-Cartesian dimension of the Demonstratio and describe Huet’s
attempt to equate geometric certainty with historical certainty. Huet’s most influential
teacher, Father Pierre Mambrun (1601-1661), who taught at Caen from 1647 to 1653,
introduced him to formal philosophy after subjecting him to a rigorous course of
geometry. 26 Huet remembered the experience in his memoirs:
Although I by no means repented the labour I had bestowed on geometry, yet I was
rendered sensible of the injury I had sustained by the neglect of philosophy, concerning
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which it was said by the ancients, that no gift more excellent had been, not would be,
conferred by the Gods upon mankind. 27

Despite the rigors of Mambrun’s instruction, Huet became deeply attached to his teacher.
Mambrun served as a surrogate father for Huet, and the two remained close friends until
Mambrun’s death in 1661. This friendship can be traced through an extensive
correspondence, in which Huet often recounted his spiritual and intellectual endeavors. 28
Upon commencing the study of geometry with Mambrun, Huet began the second
cycle in the Jesuit curriculum, that of philosophy. This broad discipline encompassed
logic, physics, metaphysics, ethics, and natural philosophy. The study of philosophy
supplied the students with conceptual instruments they would need at the advanced
faculties of theology, law, and medicine. 29 The curriculum of this cycle was based on the
scholastic tradition of Aristotelian science; as the Ratio Studiorum instructed, “In matters
of any importance, let him not depart from Aristotle [unless Aristotle conflicts in some
way with the conclusions of Christian teaching].” 30
During the seventeenth century the course in logic relied on Aristotle’s Organon:
The Categories, On Interpretation, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics, and On
Sophistical Refutations. The student first was introduced to the rules of logic and “the
three distinctive mental operations: apprehension, judgment, and ratiocination.” 31 Then
the student learned how the rules of logic could be applied to the “investigation and
demonstration of knowledge.” 32
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Pierre Gautruche (1602-1681), who also instructed Huet at Caen, composed a
textbook Philosophiae ac Mathematicae totius clara, brevis et accurate institution (The
clear, brief, and precise instruction in all philosophy and mathematics – 1661).
Gautruche carefully followed the Aristotelian division of philosophy in his organization
of the work. He began his epistemological discussion with the Aristotelian dictum, “there
is nothing in the mind that has not first been in the senses” and sought to define the tools
for the accurate interpretation of sense experience. 33 These tools included argument,
method, definition and division. 34
The use of the syllogism was essential to Aristotelian philosophy. An example of
a conclusion proved by a syllogism appears in Huet’s own skeptical treatise: “Peter is a
rational animal.” 35 The conclusion can be derived from two premises: the particular
premise would argue that Peter is a man, while the general premise would state that all
men are rational animals. The conclusion to any syllogism depended on the logical
relationship between universal and particular propositions. Gautruche and other
Aristotelians believed that the syllogism was capable of yielding new knowledge that
described the real nature and causes of things. 36
However, the usefulness of the syllogism was not uncontested among the students
of scholasticism. In the Traité, Huet criticized the circular nature of this method:
They would prove for Instance that Peter is a rational Animal: See how they reason.
Every Man is a rational Animal; Peter is a Man, therefore Peter is a rational Animal. The
first of these Propositions being universal, does principally pass for true, because every
Man in particular is a rational Animal…out of the Mass of these particular propositions,
which declare every man to be a rational Animal, this universal Proposition was formed;
viz. every Man is a rational animal: from thence it follows that the Certainty of this
33
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universal Proposition, depends on the Certainty of all those particular Propositions. But in
reasoning we now call into account, the Certainty of the particular Proposition depends
on the Certainty of the universal…thus we fall into that vicious Reasoning called a
Circle. 37

For Huet, the syllogism could not prove anything with certainty, because the premises
were interdependent on each other and could not withstand scrutiny autonomously.
In general, the Aristotelian scholastics considered all objects in terms of their
substantial and accidental properties. The substantial properties were those necessary to
the object, belonging to its essence. Absent this essence, the object could no longer
maintain its particular identity. Accidental properties were unessential, literally and
metaphorically, and were often virtually interchangeable. These included color, size,
shape, and other properties that could change without transforming the essence of an
object. Furthermore, Aristotle had drawn a distinction between matter and form and had
argued that when a change takes place, the matter remains invariable while the form
alters.
The Aristotelian notion of causality outlined four classes of causes: material,
formal, efficient, and final. The material cause described the matter from which the thing
came to be. The formal cause described the particular essence of the thing. The efficient
cause was the agent that actualized a form from its material cause. The final cause was
the purpose for which the thing existed. Such a classification of causes was seen as
particularly problematic for the critics of Aristotelianism, because it made claims about
the real, not just the apparent, nature of things.
Various challenges to the Aristotelian philosophy emerged in the seventeenth
century. One of the earliest oppositions to Aristotelian Scholasticism was formulated by
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Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in England. The Baconian intellectual revolution swept
England and offered an entire re-organization of human knowledge. Identifying the key
faults in the epistemological and ontological frameworks proposed by Aristotelian
Scholasticism, Bacon reinforced the empirical nature of human knowledge. Thus, he
branded the method of induction as the best way of learning and knowing things about
the world. Bacon’s induction was based on gathering evidence and only later organizing
it into more general categories, always leaving room for adjustment. Though the
Aristotelians were also technically empiricists, Bacon sought to oppose the scholastic
method of deduction, largely based on the logic of syllogisms. He argued this method
was not capable of creating new knowledge because the syllogism did not accurately
reflect “the subtlety of nature.” He also wrote, “The logic now in use serves rather to fix
and give stability to the errors which have foundations in currently received notions.” 38
Bacon’s New Organon (1620) emphasized the limits of human knowledge, but
used this emphasis to advocate an improvement in the gathering of knowledge. Thus, he
proposed the use of instruments and experiments to assist the weakness of the human
senses. Bacon’s epistemological emphasis on empiricism and his proposed method of
experimentation inspired a following of natural philosophers, primarily in England.
Thinkers such as Robert Boyle, John Locke, and Isaac Newton all emerged as the
luminaries of the new Baconian world. These natural philosophers dramatically
revolutionized their disciplines, sweeping away traditionally established university
curricula.
In France, René Descartes and his new system presented the most direct threat to
Aristotelian scholasticism. Bacon did not drastically revise Aristotelian epistemology, but
38
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rather attempted to apply Aristotle’s notion that nothing comes into the mind but from the
senses. Descartes, on the other hand, presented a rationalist epistemology that argued for
the existence of innate knowledge in the human mind. The most basic disagreement
between the Aristotelian and Cartesian systems consisted in this difference in
epistemology. Unlike the Aristotelians, Descartes did not think that all knowledge arose
from sense experience. In his Meditationes de prima philosophia (Meditations on First
Philosophy – 1641) and in his Principia Philosophiae (Principles of Philosophy – 1644),
Descartes argued that the human mind, by the light of reason alone, could arrive at
substantive truths concerning the fundamental laws of nature. 39 For example, he asserted
that the total quantity of motion in the world was conserved, and that this was known a
priori, following necessarily and logically from the immutability of God. Accordingly,
for Descartes, the basic structure of the world was discovered independently of
experience, was metaphysically necessary, and was known with metaphysical certainty.
Descartes based his foundational conception of knowledge on a single indubitable
certainty, cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I exist), from which he derived his criterion
of truth. 40 For the Cartesians, knowledge could be attained and verified through intuition
and demonstration. Human beings could only be certain of those things of which they
formed clear and distinct ideas and the truth of which they could demonstrate. Thus, if
one clearly and distinctly perceived the necessary existence of God and of substance in
one’s mind, these objects had to exist necessarily in the realm of objective reality. 41
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In general philosophical terms, this debate is known as one between schools that
favor either a posteriori reason or a priori reason, that is, between empiricists and
rationalists, a debate whose roots can be found in the ancient contest between
Aristotelians and Platonists. Empiricists argued that human beings arrive at knowledge of
the external world through sense experience, suggesting that the origin of all ideas about
the natural world is external to the mind. A mind before sense experience is thus a tabula
rasa. Proponents of a priori reason, the rationalists, on the other hand, claimed that all
human beings are born with certain innate ideas, and therefore, some ideas do not come
into the mind through the senses. In the context of seventeenth-century France, this
debate is manifested by the contest between the Aristotelian Scholastics and the
Cartesians.
This epistemological debate was heightened by a theological dispute about the
consequences of original sin and man’s fall from grace. The theological dispute derives
its origins from the tension between Augustinian and Thomistic thought. 42 The view
advanced by St. Augustine (354-430) stressed the fatal consequences of the fall, arguing
that it inherently corrupted man’s knowledge, especially given the severe limitations of
imperfect, corporeal sense experience. Thus, for the Augustinians, man’s soul was so
corrupted that it could never arrive at true knowledge or certainty without divine
guidance and intervention. The Thomists, who followed the doctrines of theologian St.
Thomas Aquinas (c.1225-1274), disputed such a pessimistic view of the human condition.
They agreed that man’s natural light was lost after the fall and that all knowledge had to
be gained through the senses. However, unlike St. Augustine, who lamented the
corporeality of man’s fallen condition, St. Thomas remained confident that true and
42
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certain knowledge, including proofs of the existence of God, could be arrived at a
posteriori, from the experience of the external world. 43
In physics and metaphysics, Descartes proposed a new system that distinguished
all substances into two sorts: immaterial thinking being and corporeal extended being. 44
He asserted the essence of mind to be thought and the essence of matter to be extension.
The existence of both of these was guaranteed by a perfect being: God. 45
Under this division, the Cartesians systematically rejected the Aristotelian notion
of causality and instead proposed, in physics, a purely mechanistic universe. In
opposition to the Aristotelian system that distinguished between substantial and
accidental forms, Cartesianism considered physical phenomena only in terms of
extension and motion.
Natural philosophers welcomed the Cartesian revolution, because it presented
concrete methods that could be supported by evidence. The Dutch mathematician,
astronomer, and physicist, Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695), proclaimed his approval for
the Cartesian system, contrasting it with Aristotelian scholasticism:
What was very evident in the beginning, when this philosophy [of Descartes] had just
begun to appear, is that one understood what Mr. Descartes said unlike the other
philosophers who used words which caused nothing to be understood, such as qualities,
substantial forms, intentional species, etc. He rejected this impertinent rubbish more
completely than anyone had ever done. 46

Huygens perceived the Aristotelian philosophy as an impediment to the understanding of
natural philosophy, because scholastic classifications failed to reflect the apparent nature
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of the physical world. Like Thomas Hobbes, who defined all terms without sensory
referents to be literally and metaphorically “non-sense,” Huygens was frustrated by the
obscurity of the Aristotelian terminology. Cartesian physics offered natural philosophers
the opportunity to address physics mechanistically and empirically.
In his youth Huet was similarly attracted to the apparent clarity of the Cartesian
system, but he later came to reject its tenets:
At this period Descartes published the principles of his sect; and as, during the three
preceding years, I had given my attention to philosophy, and was abundantly furnished
with the dogmas and precepts of this science, I felt an ardent desire to become acquainted
with the opinions of this writer…and I cannot easily express the admiration which this
new mode of philosophizing excited in my young mind, when, from the simplest and
plainest principles, I saw so many dazzling wonders brought forth, and the whole fabric
of the world and the nature of things, as it were, spontaneously springing to existence…
and I long wandered in the mazes of this reasoning delirium, till mature years, and a full
examination of the system from its foundations, compelled me to renounce it, as I
obtained demonstrative proof that it was a baseless structure, and tottered from the very
ground. 47

The emphasis that Huet placed on the apparent simplicity of the Cartesian system
resembled Huygens’s sentiment about Cartesianism’s appeal to natural philosophers, but
it also signaled, perhaps above all, his dissatisfaction with Aristotelian scholasticism.
In a letter from Huet to Mambrun in 1660, the former revealed a turn away from
Aristotelianism to Greek atomism in the consideration of natural philosophy and
metaphysics:
Although, indeed, like other men, [Aristotle] prated idly about some matters sometimes
(and most of all in physics), he was, nonetheless most admirably expert in other subjects.
He skillfully revealed such an infinity – and clearly such a great abundance – of things
nature had concealed. Certainly regarding the principles of physics, I strongly approve
the ideas of Leucippus, ideas that were then asserted and skillfully fashioned by
Democritus and Epicurus. Indeed, I cannot either grasp nor mediate very well that first
material [the Peripatics] call substantial forms. Apparently the hypothesis of atoms is
easier [to comprehend] and more suited to the appearance of the truth. 48
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Huet communicated these sentiments privately and, until the publication of the Traité, he
refrained from openly criticizing the Aristotelians. His expressions of antiAristotelianism, when published, were always implicit. For example, when attacking the
Cartesian notion of the mind, Huet designated an Epicurean and not an Aristotelian to be
his spokesman against the notion of immaterial thought. 49 Similarly, Huet conflated
Aristotelian and Epicurean ideas to oppose the Cartesian notions of causality and
metaphysics. He chastised the Cartesian argument regarding causes and effects, claiming
that it was “as easy for Descartes to produce from it some imaginary world as to produce
this world.” 50 Aristotle and Epicurus, on the other hand, “were able to validly infer
specifically defined effects.” 51
Huet’s rejection of Cartesianism will be thoroughly addressed in the following
chapter, but it is important to identify when Huet decisively turned away from
Descartes’s philosophy. In 1666, he wrote a letter to his Jesuit friend René Rapin (16211687), describing his intellectual endeavors:
During this retreat, I recently determined to battle Cartesianism, and to recall it before the
bar of my judgment. A bold deed, if that doctrine is taken at the mad value given it in this
age. If however, one considers the matter [the philosophy] in and of itself, and
investigates it carefully, starting with its principles, nothing is more futile. 52

Later in his life, Huet devoted two works to a refutation of the Cartesian system. The
Censura cartesianae philosophiae was a serious philosophical work that attacked the
basic epistemological and ontological arguments of Descartes. The Nouveau mémoires
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pour servir à l'histoire du Cartésianisme was, by contrast, a parody that related a fictional
account of Descartes (who at this point was long dead) living in Lapland and teaching
philosophy.
Huet’s rejection of Descartes should also be considered in the context of a second
major response to Aristotelian scholasticism in seventeenth century France. Marin
Mersenne and Pierre Gassendi presented a skeptical challenge to the scholastic world, but
maintained a limited role for skepticism. While rejecting the Aristotelian and the
Cartesian notions that certain and necessary truths could be established about the nature
of reality, Mersenne and Gassendi accepted the possibility of attaining probable
knowledge based on appearances. Thus, although they did not accept the ultimate
conclusions of the Pyrrhonists, they rejected the dogmatic principles of the Aristotelians
and of the Cartesians.
Mersenne composed an attack on Pyrrhonism in his La Vérité des Sciences contre
les Sceptiques ou Pyrrhoniens (The Truth of the Sciences Against the Skeptics or
Pyrrhonians – 1625). He argued that although the skeptics were correct regarding the
human inability to know the real nature of things, they erroneously rejected the useful
information that could be gained about the apparent nature of the world. Thus, one had to
accept that at least something could be and was known about the world. 53 Mersenne’s
work consists of a discussion between an alchemist, a skeptic, and a Christian
Philosopher. The alchemist likely represented the Aristotelian system, because he
neglected to refer to sense experience in his account for the natural world. Mersenne
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favorably situated himself between the extremes of dogmatists and skeptics, proposing a
new limited form of empiricism.
Gassendi, who, like Mersenne, was a cleric, adopted a similar philosophical
framework. He criticized the dogmatic view for exaggerating the power of the human
mind, while chastising the skeptics for adopting the opposite extreme. The senses could
prove to be unreliable, but their errors could be corrected and their reliability increased. 54
Gassendi also attempted to establish the exact nature of his epistemological world view. 55
In his De vita et moribus Epicure (Concerning the Life and Morals of Epicurus – 1647)
and his Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii (Notes on the Tenth Book
of Diogenes Laertius – 1649), Gassendi revived Epicurean atomism, proposing it as a
new alternative for natural philosophy. His system provided explanations of the basic
physical, chemical, and biological phenomena by referring to the ancient Greek notion
that all matter is composed of infinitely small matters moving in a void. Gassendi
modified the classical theory by suggesting that atoms were created and set in motion by
God. 56
Gassendi’s and Mersenne’s ontological and epistemological systems presented a
middle ground for the natural philosophy of the seventeenth century. Thus, they adhered
to skepticism in opposition to the dogmatic schools of Cartesianism and Aristotelianism
and sought to construct new physical and metaphysical systems. However, they did not
persistently address the religious dimension of skepticism. Huet’s epistemological
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theories had much in common with those of Mersenne and Gassendi, but he was
committed to skepticism for religious and not for scientific reasons.
While Huet’s skeptical treatise was not published until 1723, he composed it
between 1690 and 1692. 57 In addition to hiding his work until his death and writing it
under the pseudonym Théocrite de Pulvignac, seigneur de la Roche, Huet framed the
Traité in a way that rhetorically distanced him from its main ideas. 58 Thus, he began his
preface by stating, “Hear, my dear Friends not my Opinion, touching the Nature of
human Understanding, and Reason, but that of an excellent Person, very well versed in
all the ancient and modern Sects of Philosophy.”59 All the subsequent arguments on
behalf of skepticism and its benefits are advanced by this “provincial Man of Quality.” 60
While such a framing may seem a commonplace literary device, Huet’s encounter
with the provincial man of quality was anything but fictional. As evident from his
Mémoires, Huet’s interlocutor was Louis Cormis, whom Huet met in Caen toward the
end of the 1650’s. 61 Although the exact date of their meeting remains unknown, the
meeting took place before 1660, when Huet confessed skepticism in a letter to Mambrun.
In the Mémoires, he wrote:
And hardly a day passed without him coming to see me or I going to see him and together
we strolled, either along the most agreeable banks of the Orne or through the greenest
meadows. Moreover, we generally conversed about the ancient philosophical sects, since
he was not only exceptionally learned in all of them, but especially so in those that
commanded the mind to abstain from all assent. And thus above all he wholly approved
Sextus Empiricus’ teachings, and his commendation so affected [me] that the author who
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until then had been merely a name to me was read by me diligently, became very familiar
to me, and I conceived the highest opinion of him. 62

This passage presented one of Huet’s only published revelations of his personal
predilection for Sextus Empiricus. Because the Mémoires were published during his
lifetime, Huet was careful to exclude any expressions of commitment to skepticism itself.
He declared his “high opinion” of Sextus Empiricus, but did not state that he became a
skeptic. Instead, he described his affinity for Cormis, whose influence was crucial to
Huet’s eventual commitment to skepticism. Huet’s autobiographical account of the
encounter with Cormis was very similar to his description of the interlocutor in the Traité.
Before articulating his skepticism, Huet’s interlocutor described his intellectual
progression:
I was very much disturbed at those perpetual Disputes of Philosophers, upon all Subjects;
and in Expectation of the great Advantages of Philosophy, which were so much boasted
of, Knowledge of Truth, and Tranquility of Mind: I was much surprised to find my self
plunged in the thick Darkness of invincible Ignorance, and Debates of which I could see
no End. And being educated in the Philosophy of Aristotle, according to the Custom of
the Age, I was still more astonished that the Sect of that Philosopher only, should be able
to produce so great a Diversity of Opinions, of Greeks, Arabians, and Latins, of Ancients
and Moderns. 63

This account described the consequences of a philosophical itinerary that ended in a
complete disillusionment with all dogmatic systems. While the passage specifically
pertained to Cormis, it could easily be applied to Huet’s own quest for a coherent
philosophical system. Like Huet, Cormis was educated as an Aristotelian, but soon he
became disappointed with the number of disagreements within the Aristotelian school
itself. 64 He was attracted to the novel system proposed by Descartes, but he did not find it
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to be more convincing than the Aristotelian system. 65 Cormis turned to Gassendi and
then to Plato, but, once again, remained unconvinced by the tenets of either school.
Finally, Cormis encountered the skeptical doctrines of Arcesilas, Carneades, and Pyrrho.
Although he did not “approve of their Opinion in everything,” he agreed with the general
notion that neither he “nor any other Man else ever had any natural Faculty to discover
Truth with full and absolute Assurance.” 66
While Cormis’s road to skepticism may not exactly mirror Huet’s intellectual
odyssey (for instance, there is no evidence that Huet was ever attracted to Platonism), the
two intellectual journeys have essential things in common. The quest for truth and
certainty within various philosophical systems led both to question and eventually to
reject man’s ability to know any philosophical truths with certainty. Huet and Cormis
accepted the basic tenets of skeptical philosophy, because they agreed with its account of
the limited nature of human understanding.
The distinction between ontological and epistemological skepticism is crucial to
understanding Huet’s skeptical system. An ontological skeptic would typically assert that
true and certain knowledge of the natural world did not exist. On the other hand, an
epistemological skeptic, like Huet, did not reject the theoretical existence of such certain
knowledge, but simply denied the human ability to gain it in practice by means of sense
experience and reason. 67 Thus, as he claimed in Book II of the Traité:
I deny not but there is Truth, to be found in things themselves, I mean that which is called
Truth of Existence: for God knows things as they really are. But there is an Impediment
in Man, which withholds him from it, and this impediment consists in the Want of proper
and necessary Means to know Truth perfectly. 68
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Huet’s basic skeptical conclusion about the weakness of the human mind was
formulated in a series of definitions in the first chapter of the Traité. He defined
philosophy as the “Study of Wisdom, the search of Truth…by the assistance of
Reason.” 69 He then identified the human mind as “A Principle, or Power born in Man,
moved or excited to form Ideas, and Thoughts, by the Reception and Impression of
Species in the Brain.” 70 These species were “traces imprinted into the Brain by the
Motion of the Spirits and Nerves, when they are agitated by the Organs of Sensation.” 71
From this, it followed that an “Idea or an Image” was the result of this impression. 72
Huet’s first three definitions revealed his empirical epistemology, suggesting that all
ideas come into the mind from external sources through the senses.
He further defined thought as “the Action of the Understanding, moved and
determined by Species in the Brain, to form to it self Ideas, to compare, and judge of
them together.” 73 Reason, for Huet, was the faculty of human understanding that
searched “after Truth by its natural Operations.” 74 Finally, Huet defined the “truth of
judgment” as the “agreement or correspondence” between the object of consideration that
existed outside of human perception and the idea or image of that object in the human
mind. 75 Thus, an agreement between the object and the idea of that object required the
knowledge of both. However, since the human mind could only know the external objects
through the ideas formed by the mind, the verification of an agreement between the
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object and the idea proved impossible. Consequently, Huet concluded that “man cannot
know Truth with perfect Certainty by the Aid of Reason.” 76
Building on these definitions, Huet proposed that there were “two ways of
knowing Truth” – with uncertainty or certainty. 77 The latter path to truth was further
divided into two degrees: divine and human certainty. Huet claimed that human certainty
could be considered in degrees of probability but could never reach an absolute level.78
Huet’s letter to Mambrun, expressing his predilection for Epicurean theory also
revealed his probabilistic view of knowledge. Having declared his preference for the
atomistic theory Huet wrote:
However, I desire that these be admitted only as hypotheses – not as the Democretians
considered them, i.e., absolute [truth]. All things certainly have their origins in atoms,
and thus are [destroyed] when resolved into them; they appeared to adhere to this opinion
as if to a sacrament. I in truth admit this as most probable, not as certain. Most pleasing is
the method of the best Academy of which Carneades is reported the father, because truly
they sought that which had the appearance of truth and the probable: moreover,
[Carneades] discerned nothing as true and proven, and swore by the words of no master;
but secured that which had the appearance of truth from whatever source it might arise,
and rested in that. 79

Thus, Huet combined dogmatic Epicureanism with Academic skepticism and argued that
all conclusions about the physical world were provisional. While Huet accepted that there
were probable systems of natural philosophy, he refused to grant full certainty to any
such system. The letter also indicates that he had adopted a skeptical outlook in
epistemology by the age of thirty, before having published any of his major works. Thus,
Huet’s private correspondence proves useful, because it reveals candid expressions of
philosophical views that Huet did not advertise openly until the publication of the Traité.
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In the Traité, Huet argued that in contrast to the probabilistic nature of human
certainty, divine certainty, attained by faith in divine revelation, guaranteed true
knowledge about God’s revelation and provided the highest degree of assurance. 80 Thus,
having formulated his view of man’s inherent inability to arrive at certainty through
reason, Huet urged his readers to rely on faith for “fortifying the Imbecility of Reason
and the Senses, dissipating the Obscurity of Doubts, and sustaining the anxious Mind.” 81
In Book II of the Traité, Huet argued that the ultimate end of suspending
judgment in the search for philosophical truths was not to avoid error, but to “prepare the
mind for the Reception of divine Faith.” 82 While faith provided the highest attainable
level of earthly certainty, it nonetheless remained beneath the “certainty of the Blessed”
that occurred only in the afterlife. 83 Huet’s pessimism regarding man’s rational abilities
was in many ways similar to Augustinian arguments about the consequences of the fall.
Huet not only rejected the possibility of knowing truth through reason, but he argued that
faith itself could not be an absolute basis of certainty, constrained as it was by man’s
earthly nature.
Book I of Huet’s Traité furnished a series of attempts to prove the inadequacy of
human reason. He reaffirmed the religious and Scriptural basis of his skepticism, citing
Solomon’s statements about the uselessness of man’s inexorable and doomed search after
truth, the corruption of the soul by the body, and the weakness of man’s reason.84 He
quoted various arguments of the holy fathers of the Church: Arnobius, Lactantius, and
Gregory Nazanien. Huet offered St. Augustine’s description of human understanding as
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“obscured by the habitual Darkness, with which it is covered in the Night of Sin, [and]
cannot readily see the clearness nor Sanctity of Reason.” 85 Finally, Huet claimed that
even St. Thomas Aquinas “pronounced that our Minds are so hampered by the Senses,
they cannot comprehend Things perfectly, and their imbecility is so great, that if they
would judge of Matters which are certain in themselves, they will become uncertain.” 86
Huet marshaled a series of detailed proofs of the weakness of the human mind,
referring to the nature of things, the nature of the mind itself, the incomprehensibility of
the essence of things, the continuing mutability of things, the difference in and
imperfection of human perception, the infinity of causes, the absence of a criterion of
truth, the inadequacy of evidence, the circular nature of proving the certainty of reason by
reason, and the fallibility of all dogmatic opinions. Huet’s last demonstration provided
the articulation of the law of doubting, as advanced by a variety of ancient philosophers.
Book II proposed “the most sure and legitimate way of Philosophizing,”
elaborating upon the issues proposed in the first book. Huet stressed that “man is by
nature so made, that he cannot himself attain to the Knowledge of Truth.” 87 He sought to
substantiate the supplementary role of faith with respect to reason, and he proposed the
exact purposes of doubting. Toward the end of the book, Huet urged that philosophers
should not tie themselves “to the Sentiments of any Author,” but select from every sect
that which has “some Appearance of Truth.” 88 He concluded the second part of the Traité
by refusing to adhere to any particular skeptical school: “Not being an Academick,
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Sceptick, Eclectick, or of any other Sect I must answer I am my own, that is to say at
liberty, unwilling to submit to any Authority.” 89
His refusal to accept fully the principles of any single system, including some
tenets of the skeptics, certainly indicates that Huet was attempting to remain consistently
skeptical throughout his Traité. An espousal of any particular philosophical system would
have jeopardized the aim of Huet’s project. He ended the Traité by outlining and
answering the major objections to the proposed system, showing both his willingness to
entertain objections and his system’s ability to withstand them. Indeed, Huet left the
reader of the Traité with the freedom to accept or reject the skeptical system, thereby
placing his audience in the identical position with respect to himself, that he occupied
with respect to Cormis.
While the most general aim of Huet’s Traité was to advocate the utility of
skepticism for philosophy and for religion, Huet’s main argument appears to be contrary
to the spirit of Pyrrhonian doubt. The first two books aimed to demonstrate definitively
the weakness of the human mind and of human reason and man’s consequent inability to
attain true and certain rational knowledge. While this formulation led the author to
advance a skeptical outlook in philosophy, the hypothesis is anything but Pyrrhonian in
its nature. Huet indeed subjected all rational conclusions to doubt, but he affirmed with
complete certainty the weakness of the human mind. This element remains the sole
constant throughout Huet’s Traité and stands in direct opposition to the Pyrrhonian
proposition that man cannot know anything with certainty, including the very proposition
that man cannot know anything with certainty. Therefore, Huet should be classified as an
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Academic and not as a Pyrrhonian skeptic, since he affirms at least one positive principle,
namely the weakness of the human mind.
***
Thus, the origins of Huet’s skepticism lay in three phenomena. First, his quest for
a universal proof of the Christian religion and his encounter with a large variety of
ancient and modern texts opened Huet’s mind to conflicting opinions, which forced him
to reconsider his own beliefs. Second, Huet’s disillusionment with his Aristotelian
education in philosophy led him to seek a new coherent philosophical framework,
ultimately leading him to repudiate all dogmatic systems. Third, Huet’s devotion to
Catholicism drove him to formulate his skepticism in a way that best supported his own
view of the relationship between faith and reason. Thus, the three causes of Huet’s
skepticism seem to spring from the traditional educational system in which Huet matured
as a scholar.
Huet’s skepticism was not a radical rebellion against the established intellectual
order, but an attempt to reconcile the inconsistencies he encountered in the course of his
intellectual development. Huet was an orthodox Catholic who attempted to maintain
intellectual integrity in a world where the incorporation of both rediscovered and new
texts presented dramatic challenges to traditional intellectual authorities. Thus, Huet’s
reaction sheds light on the tensions that existed between the aims of humanist scholarship
and Biblical exegesis, and between philosophical and theological claims to truth in
seventeenth-century France. We will address the latter issue more closely in the
following chapters.
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Chapter 2: The Cartesian Context: Huet’s Critique of the Presumption of Reason
René Descartes exercised the single most important contemporaneous intellectual
influence on Pierre-Daniel Huet. The nature of this influence was primarily negative, in
so far as it led Huet to develop a philosophy with its deepest foundations in antiCartesianism. His disdain for Cartesianism, exhibited most explicitly in the Censura
philosophiae cartesianae and in the Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du
Cartesianisme, was also present in implicit forms in the Demonstratio Evangelica, the
Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, and in the Traité philosophique de
la faiblesse de l'esprit humain. Because Descartes figured so prominently in all of Huet’s
philosophical works, this chapter will investigate, in the context of the seventeenthcentury phenomena, the philosophical origins of Huet’s critique of Descartes.
Three main contemporary interpretations of Huet’s skepticism attempt to address
his combination of skepticism and anti-Cartesianism. The first interpretation, advanced
by Christian Bartholmèss and Thomas Lennon, argues that Huet’s fideistic skepticism
was an intellectual position developed as a reaction to the rationalist confidence and the
intellectual arrogance of the Cartesian philosophy. These scholars argue that Huet was
not a sincere skeptic, but rather employed skeptical arguments as a method to defeat the
philosophical positions of Descartes and his followers. The second explanation, advanced
by Richard Popkin, suggests that Huet’s skepticism preceded and served as the primary
motivation for his anti-Cartesianism, thereby defining the essential arguments against
Descartes. The third interpretation, offered by Alan Charles Kors, claims that while Huet
was a sincere skeptic by the time he wrote the Traité, his skepticism arose as a reaction to
the interminable theological debates between Cartesians and Aristotelians.
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In opposition to these interpretations, Huet’s actual intellectual development,
discussed in the previous chapter, reveals that Huet’s commitment to skepticism and his
disdain for the Cartesian philosophy emerged almost simultaneously. While modern
interpretations provide plausible explanations of Huet’s intellectual positions, all of them
envisage Huet distinctly either as a skeptic or as an anti-Cartesian, without adequately
considering the possibility that both philosophical positions developed simultaneously,
and, consequently, depended on and contributed to each other.
Huet’s skepticism was both the cause and the result of his anti-Cartesianism. It is
a cause to the extent that Huet’s view of the human mind and of the human condition was
entirely incompatible with the Cartesian confidence in the powers of human reason. It is
clear that Huet considered himself a skeptic by 1660, while he formulated a treatise
against Descartes in 1666. 1 However, Huet’s skepticism was further informed by his
crusade against Cartesianism. Huet perceived in Descartes a threat to the established
philosophical and theological order, and he turned to skeptical arguments to defeat that
threat. In using skepticism as a weapon against the Cartesians, Huet came to adapt its
tenets in a way that could most effectively serve his purposes. Thus, while Huet’s
skepticism was directed at all dogmatic schools, it took specific issues with Cartesianism,
which gave Huet’s thought a truly unique nature.
This chapter will present the most essential disagreements between Huet’s and
Descartes’s epistemological systems, in order to explain the intellectual stakes of the
debate. It will then consider Huet’s published and unpublished reactions to Cartesian
thought and compare his implicit skeptical arguments in works prior to the Traité to the
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skeptical formulations of the Traité itself. Three elements of Huet’s critique will receive
particular attention: his assessment of Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt; his refutation of the
proposition Cogito ergo sum; and his view of the impossibility of establishing criteria of
truth. This chapter will then consider Huet’s reaction to Nicholas Malebranche (16381715), whom he perceived as one of the main disciples of Descartes. Finally, it will
evaluate contemporary historical interpretations of the relationship between Huet’s antiCartesianism and skepticism. Ultimately, this chapter will demonstrate that antiCartesianism and skepticism in Huet’s philosophy are inseparable elements in the
formation of his thought.
***
The most basic point of disagreement between Huet and Descartes arose in the
epistemological contest between empiricism and rationalism. This divergence is crucial
because it led the authors to conclusions about the powers of human reason that
ultimately define Huet as a skeptic and Descartes as a dogmatist. While Descartes
opposed the Aristotelian reliance on a posteriori reason and wanted to formulate an
epistemology based on a priori rationalism, Huet accepted the Aristotelian reliance on
empiricism. At the same time, Huet’s empirical epistemology was tainted by an
Augustinian view of fallen human nature, leading him to reject human ability to gain true
and certain knowledge about the real world.
Although Augustinian philosophy is usually associated with a pessimistic view of
the limits of natural knowledge and natural theology, it also widely appealed to the
Cartesians who were drawn to and reinforced by its critique of sensory knowledge. The
Cartesians maintained that pure intuitive reason, unhindered by the senses, remained a
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guide to truth. Consequently, they attempted to discover the basic metaphysical truths by
reason alone, without appealing to the fallen, bodily senses. 2 Thus, the Cartesians
adapted Augustine’s distrust of the senses to give authority to their own rationalist
epistemology.
Descartes’s first proof of God was the most obvious manifestation of an a priori
argument in his philosophy:
Again, the idea that enables me to understand a supreme deity, eternal, infinite,
omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things other than himself, clearly has more
objective reality within it than do those ideas through which the finite substances are
displayed. 3

The Cartesian principle of objective reality stipulated that the existence of clear and
distinct ideas of God and of substance in the mind necessitated their existence in the
realm of objective reality. Descartes claimed that all human beings had a clear and
distinct idea of God, defined as an infinite, perfect being. Since human mind was not
infinite, it could not have autonomously formed an idea of an infinite being. Descartes
concluded that an infinite being was the necessary source of this idea. 4 In the second
proof, he proposed that existence could “no more be separated from God’s essence
than…the idea of a valley can be separated from the idea of a mountain.” 5 Thus,
Descartes’s proofs of God operated outside of an empirical framework, relying entirely
on the idea of God to demonstrate His necessary existence.
In the Traité, Huet claimed that Descartes had proposed three sources of ideas:
ideas formed by sense experience; ideas formed in us; and innate ideas, among which are
2
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the idea of God, ideas of geometrical principles, and ideas of essences. 6 However, Huet
sharply disagreed and claimed that if one carefully considered the nature of the human
mind, one “will find no Idea therein that was not formed upon the Species of external
Objects.” 7 Huet affected the rare combination of a Thomistic view of epistemology and
an Augustinian pessimism regarding the human inability to arrive at certain knowledge of
the external world. Although Huet’s empiricism, as previously shown, should be
attributed to his embrace of Epicureanism rather than to his scholastic education, he was,
nevertheless, on the scholastic side of the debate. At the same time, Huet’s logical
conclusions did not match those of the Aristotelian Scholastics. While most scholastics
maintained a confidence in human reason despite the limits of empirical observation,
Huet’s empiricism led him to reject systematically the possibility of human certainty.
For Huet, as evident in the Traité, this impossibility followed from the nature of
the human mind. He argued that the human mind was “a Principle, or Power born in Man,
moved or excited to form Ideas, and Thoughts, the Reception and Impression of Species
in the Brain.” 8 He further defined the truth of judgment as the “agreement between the
Idea that is in us,” and “the external Object which is the Origin of that Idea.” 9 However,
since human beings could gain knowledge of the external object only through the
medium of the idea, they could never know the actual nature of the external object.
Consequently, it was impossible for man to verify if the idea and the object agree or
correspond with each other. Since the existence of this agreement defined truth, in Huet’s
view, it followed from the very definition of truth and from the epistemological limits of
6
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the fallen human mind that “man cannot know Truth with perfect certainty by the Aid of
Reason.” 10 Thus, by beginning with an epistemological foundation that most explicitly
rejected a priori reason, Huet consistently arrived at the conclusion that most explicitly
opposed the confidence in human reason proposed by Cartesian rationalism.
There were further consequences of this epistemological position that led Huet to
formulate skeptical arguments against both Cartesianism and dogmatism. While
Descartes buttressed his a priori epistemology by stressing the independence of the
human mind, Huet attempted to disprove this notion in his critique of the Cartesian
philosophy. Descartes perceived the mind to be of prior epistemological and logical
importance to the body. Thus, in the Meditations, Descartes was careful to specify that
the mind, not the body, was the first agent aware of its own existence. Having subjected
the very existence of the body to doubt, Descartes postulated, “I am therefore precisely
nothing but a thinking thing.” 11 Huet, on the other hand, defended the inseparability of
the physical and non-physical aspects of thought. In the Censura, Huet designated an
Epicurean interlocutor to press the Cartesian system on this point. The Epicurean argued
that immaterial thought is an absurd concept, because without the body thought would
not exist. 12 This discussion did not serve to advance any particular dogmatic assertions,
but rather formulated a critique of Descartes’s view of an incorporeal mind.
The appropriation of patristic thought remained an important element in
philosophical and theological debates of the seventeenth century. Thus, Huet
meticulously sought to undermine the Augustinian foundations of Cartesian epistemology:
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This and nothing else was meant by Augustine when he said that it is not the body that
senses, but the soul by means of the body, meaning thereby in the way that a messengers
forms in himself the message that he receives from elsewhere…since there is true vision
when the body sees while the mind is distracted, and no vision when the mind sees while
the body does not, it is evident that the body senses, not the soul. 13

Huet’s critique implied that Descartes was not only incorrect in the formulations of his
epistemology and his view of the mind, but that he also misused Augustinian doctrines.
By interpreting Augustine on knowledge in a way that supported an empirical
epistemology, Huet tried to invalidate doubly the Cartesian view of immaterial thought.
In the Traité, Huet presented further arguments to support the materiality of
thought. He attempted to dispute the Cartesian notion that reason is immaterial, claiming,
“’Tis a Maxim of the Philosopher Parmenides, that the Disposition of Man’s
Understanding depends on the Disposition of the parts of the Body.” 14 While in this
instance Huet may appear to be a dogmatist, his arguments are of a purely critical nature.
He did not seek to impose his own epistemological or ontological framework, but
advanced claims that undermined Cartesian arguments.
However, the discussion of the corporeality of thought in the Traité moved
beyond criticism and formulated explicitly skeptical conclusions. Huet did this by
presenting the logical and physical consequences of the material nature of human thought.
There were two particular proofs in the Traité that appealed to the materiality of thought
in a way that undermined the confidence in the powers of human reason. In discussing
the unreliability of the senses in his second proof, Huet suggested that physical
differences in the brain, physical agitations of the body, and age were among factors that
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crucially affected human thought and human perception. 15 Consequently, it was possible
for the same person to perceive the external world differently depending on that person’s
physical condition. This argument strongly undermined the Cartesian reliance on reason
as the criterion of certainty, suggesting that individual reason was not a suitable criterion
of truth, given its mutability and its dependence on physical conditions. 16
Similarly, the fifth proof regarding the weakness of human understanding
suggested that “things cannot be known with perfect certainty” because there is a great
difference in the perception from person to person. 17 For instance, colors, shapes, and
sizes may all appear different to different men. If all knowledge were founded on sensory
experience and individual perception, there could be no objective standard by which the
truth and certainty of knowledge could be judged. Thus, Huet quoted Euripides to
conclude that “amongst Men Nothing is equal, nor alike, except the Names of things, but
that Things themselves have Nothing in them permanent nor sure.” 18 Once again, Huet
attacked the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct ideas, suggesting that ideas depended
entirely on the subjective perception and the reason of individuals. In a world of
subjective differences, no perspective could accurately claim to conceive of an objective
reality.
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Both of these arguments in the Traité went far beyond critiques of Cartesian
philosophy. Huet sought to not only undermine the Cartesian confidence in the powers of
the mind, but to demonstrate that all dogmatic systems failed to overcome the inherent
weaknesses of the human mind. Thus, he built on his arguments regarding the materiality
of thought in the Censura and drew skeptical conclusions that were not visible in his
earlier works. However, the evolution of Huet’s expression of skeptical arguments did
not always follow this pattern, and some of Huet’s most significant skeptical assertions
surfaced much earlier than would be expected from most historical commentary.
Huet’s specific rejection of the Cartesian criterion of truth and his repudiation of
all criteria both followed from his epistemology. The inspection and rejection of
Descartes’s criterion in the Censura clearly foreshadowed the conclusion of the Traité,
where Huet claimed that God denied “a certain Rule of Truth” to human nature. 19 In the
Censura, Huet began by disparaging Descartes for both ambiguity in defining the
criterion of truth and inconsistency in abiding by that criterion. For instance, Huet
maintained that Descartes used the term “idea” not only to denote the images imprinted in
our minds, but also to describe the operations of the mind, such as comparison and
judgment. 20 At times, Descartes called upon the existence of clear and distinct ideas to
provide certainty, but at other points he used the natural light as the criterion of judgment.
For Huet, the first criterion was easily called into question because not all true
ideas were equally clear and distinct. Similarly, some false ideas could appear to be clear
and distinct. 21 Consequently, the clarity of the idea could not guarantee its truth. Huet
also questioned the actual application of clear and distinct ideas. He suggested that from
19
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the existence of disagreements among Cartesians, who all presumably appealed to the
same criterion of truth, it followed that:
Either they perceive something clearly and distinctly that is false, from which it follows
that clear and distinct perception is not a sure criterion of truth, or they do not adhere to
this standard in examining their views, and thus they do not take it to be a sure and
necessary standard. 22

Huet implicitly used the argument about differences in perception that exist even among
Cartesians to attack the Cartesian notion of objective truth. Indeed, if the formulation of
clear and distinct ideas guaranteed the truth, there would be no disagreement among those
who follow this criterion. Huet similarly ridiculed the natural light as a criterion of truth
by proposing the difficulty of distinguishing natural light, “the faculty of knowing given
to us by God,” from non-natural light. 23 In Huet’s final analysis, clear and distinct ideas
as well as the natural light were inadequate criteria of truth because they were both
capable of deceiving the human mind.
Huet also questioned the very possibility of the existence of adequate criteria of
truth:
If every truth, whether known through itself or through something else, must be signified
by a character of truth distinguishing it from falsity, this character itself is also a truth that
bears its own character of truth, that is, another truth, and so on to infinity. 24

This argument, voiced openly in the Censura and essentially taken from Sextus
Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism, presented the fundamental skeptical rejection of all
criteria of truth. The phrasing of the argument in the Censura is almost identical to the
text in the Traité:
Since the Criterium is the Rule of Truth; we must have adjusted this Rule, and be assured
that it is right, before we apply it to Truth…Now we know not how to adjust it, nor be
assured it is right, if we have another Rule of Truth, which is certainly true, and which
22
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may serve to rectify the first. This second to be well rectified, must be regulated on a
third, and this third on a fourth, and so to Infinity. 25

Huet, far from being a hidden skeptic, openly advanced the tenets of skepticism as
early as 1689. So, perhaps, the critics of Huet’s Traité who read the Censura should not
have been taken aback by Huet’s skepticism. Although Huet carefully framed most of his
skeptical arguments in the Censura so as to distance himself from the label of skeptic, in
this particular case he overtly donned the skeptical hat. This instance also demonstrates
the extent to which the Censura and Huet’s anti-Cartesianism influenced the formulation
of his skepticism.
Descartes’s and Huet’s respective epistemologies led the thinkers to adopt
drastically contrasting conclusions about the powers of human reason. However, there
was another crucial element that followed from the difference in epistemology. Descartes
began his Meditations with a hyperbolic doubt, but came to the most certain conclusions
about the existence of the external world. Huet, on the other hand, framed his skeptical
arguments in a way that doubt became the ultimate end of his philosophy. In fact, Huet’s
first chapter in the Censura attacked what he saw as Descartes’s fallacious use of
hyperbolic doubt from several perspectives.
Contemporaneous and contemporary interpretations of Cartesian doubt should be
considered before Huet’s own criticisms can be discussed. While this thesis does not aim
to discern the true nature of Cartesian doubt, it is useful to review the spectrum of
interpretations and criticisms of this doubt in order to situate Huet’s own reactions to
Descartes’s method. A number of thinkers in the seventeenth century scrutinized the
authenticity of the Cartesian doubt and considered it to be a dialectical method of refuting
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the skeptics to arrive at certitude. Indeed, Descartes’s disciples sought to dispel any
notion that Descartes was a real skeptic, describing his doubt as a provisionary method
for dispelling prejudices to arrive at scientific truths. 26 For instance, Pierre-Sylvain Regis
(1637-1707) suggested that Descartes did not intend to speak of a true doubt. 27 This
interpretation is also defended by modern scholars like Popkin, who interprets
Descartes’s hyperbolic doubt as a strategy to defeat skepticism on its own terms. 28
Popkin suggests that while Descartes did not intend to appear as a skeptic, the
effects of his arguments certainly advanced the skeptical cause. 29 Indeed, philosophers
such as Jacobus Guilielmus Feverlinus (1689-1766) chastised Descartes for being the
moral cause of atheism and skepticism due to the inadequacy of his method. 30 Others
went further and claimed that Cartesian doubt was an explicit profession of skepticism.
Historian Carlo Borghero argues that the hyperbolic doubt proposed by Descartes went
far beyond any skeptical arguments by denying the testimony of the senses, stressing the
uncertainty of mathematics, and advancing the hypothesis of God-the-deceiver.
Revealingly, Huet’s own reaction to the hyperbolic doubt advanced in the
Meditations does not fall within these categories. Huet neither thought that Descartes
feigned doubt nor perceived Descartes’s involuntary support for skepticism. Instead, Huet
believed that Descartes started out as a skeptic, but later created a fallacious dogmatic
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system. 31 Huet’s manuscript of the Censura reveals his surprise at Descartes’s emergence
from the state of hyperbolic doubt:
All of a sudden, this irresolute man, who wants one to doubt all things, changes in an
instant and, without telling us that he is sure that God or some evil genie does not deceive
us, he affirms with full confidence that he thinks that he exists. One more time I would
like to know how this man, who does not know if God, in creating him, did not subject
him to a world of perpetual illusions, [how this man] can be assured that he does not
make a mistake when he believes that he is, that he thinks, that there are contradictory
things. 32

To Huet, Descartes’s leap from complete uncertainty to full confidence seemed entirely
inconsistent with the latter’s earlier doubts. How could someone who a moment ago was
contemplating whether God was a deceiver, all of a sudden gain such certainty in the
truth of his own thoughts? Huet considered this to be an erroneous logical leap, as
Descartes “breaks faith and promise by assuming as true what is no less doubtful than
other things that he considered to be treatable as false.” 33 Essentially, Huet claimed that
Descartes did not adequately escape the skeptical framework that he created at the outset
of his Meditations.
Descartes’s essential problem, for Huet, was in the principle Cogito ergo sum that
lay the foundation of all Cartesian philosophy. After subjecting all acquired knowledge to
doubt and distrusting all of his senses, the meditating voice of Descartes concludes that
because he was able to persuade himself of the inexistence of the world within his
meditation, he must exist since he is aware of the persuasion. When all else in the
surrounding world is gone, including the body, thought continues to exist. Therefore,
31
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thought and an agent that thinks [a thinking thing] must exist. Descartes is aware of his
thinking process, and by virtue of that awareness he concludes that he exists. 34 Thus, for
Descartes, both the awareness of one’s own existence and the reflection upon that
existence guarantee that existence.
For Huet, the most significant fault of the Cogito ergo sum principle was that it
engaged in circular reasoning. “This argument reduces to that of Chrysippus…If I exist, I
exist; or, I am, therefore I am. I thereby assume that I am in order to prove that I am, and
I argue in a vicious circle.” 35 Descartes’s use of “I” in the clause “I am a thinking thing”
already implies existence of the subject. Huet argued that the proposition “I exist” does
not follow from the premise “I am a thinking thing.” 36 Thinking in no way implies
existence, if existence itself is subjected to doubt. Thus, Huet blamed Descartes for
engaging in circular reasoning because Descartes assumed that he exists in order to prove
that he exists.
Furthermore, the very grammar of Descartes’s proposition made no logical sense
to Huet, who distinguished between three things in considering the proposition “I am
thinking:” the mind that is thinking, the action of thinking, and the object of the
thought. 37 In his manuscript of the Censura, Huet proposed to subject the proposition “I
am thinking, therefore I am” to such a division into parts:
When he states “I think,” what is the object of which his mind thinks? It could only be his
thought. Yet, this thought about which he reflects, is not the one which he forms in
thinking of it;…One must say: “I think that I was thinking,” since our mind cannot think
of more than one object [in a given moment], any more than our eyes can perceive more
than one thing at a time. This is why when I think that I think, this necessarily supposes
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two thoughts, where one reflects on the other, the latter [thought reflects] on the former
one, the present [thought reflects] on the past one. 38

Huet deconstructed Descartes’s ambiguous use of “I am thinking” in order to show that
even if thought did guarantee existence, it could not do so without reference to the past.
Such a reference to the past, however, destroyed the momentous realization of one’s
existence on which the Cogito principle depended. Aiming for the jugular, Huet sought to
destroy the principle on which Cartesian doubt was abandoned and to plunge the
Cartesians back into their own net of uncertainty.
Nor did Huet wish to entertain seriously the Cartesian claim that Descartes only
feigned his doubt:
I respond that what Descartes thought about his existence is not an issue between us, but
rather whether he undertook to question and prove his existence, and whether, having
done so, he satisfactorily did so through argument and reasoning. 39

Huet explicitly refused to speculate about the sincerity of Cartesian doubt. Instead, he
wished to demonstrate that the leap from skepticism to dogmatism was inadequately
justified, because “if our existence were known to us by itself why were Democritus and
the Academics in doubt about their own?” 40 Thus, Huet argued that whether or not
Descartes’s doubt about his own existence was feigned or sincere, his departure from that
doubt was not supported by adequate arguments.
Huet’s frustration with Descartes becomes apparent when he writes, “But he
[Descartes] left off doubting just when it was most necessary to doubt, namely, at a
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principle that is no less uncertain than all the other that he subjected to doubt.” 41 Huet
added in his manuscript: “He [Descartes] does not begin to err until the moment when he
separates himself from the skeptics.” 42 While at the time of the publication of the
Censura Huet did not hold the reputation of a skeptic, this lament certainly revealed his
appreciation for the skeptical use of doubt.
Later in the Censura, Huet entirely rejected the feign hypothesis and argued that
for Descartes, doubt was authentically skeptical in its beginning stages:
For when they [Cartesians] say that Descartes only feigned doubt but that the skeptics
really doubted, I agree with the latter but find the former unsupported by any argument.
For by what mark can the feigned doubt of Descartes be distinguished from the real doubt
of the skeptics? The skeptics philosophize in the same way as does Descartes: they each
search after truth, they each avoid error, they each think that error is avoided through
doubt, which they each therefore advocate. 43

Huet’s attitude supports Lennon’s interpretation. Huet really did consider that Descartes
began his Meditations as a sincere skeptic and then committed an intellectually dishonest
leap from doubt to certainty. 44 Huet seemed to express a certain amount of enthusiasm
for the similarity between Descartes and the skeptics, thereby revealing his own
predilection for skeptical philosophy.
At the same time, Huet argued that Descartes and the Cartesians inherently
misunderstood the skeptics and their reasons for doubt. The skeptics, unlike Descartes,
continued to suspend their judgment “because nothing seemed to them capable of being
perceived with sufficient clarity or certainty.” 45 Huet deflected the Cartesian accusation
that all skeptics doubt simply in order to doubt, and explicitly offered the explanation
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from Sextus Empiricus: “The Cartesians should indeed know that the ultimate goal of the
skeptical philosophy is not doubt but tranquility in those things that depend on
opinion.” 46 In this statement, Huet both scolded the Cartesians for their ignorance of
ancient philosophy and furtively defended the tenets of skepticism against
misinterpretation.
Huet expanded on the skeptical reasons for doubt in the Traité, suggesting that the
suspension of judgment has both an immediate goal and a remote end. The former goal
consisted in “avoiding Error, Obstinacy, and Arrogance.” The latter goal, in Huet’s
fideistic view, prepared the mind for the “Reception of the divine Faith.” 47 Huet’s
fideism and the ultimate end of his skeptical doubt will be discussed further in the next
chapter; here the immediate goals of doubt require closer scrutiny.
A typical skeptic would normally attribute the existence of inherent philosophical
errors to any dogmatic system. Huet’s use of the words “obstinacy” and “arrogance,” on
the other hand, seems to single out Cartesianism. While Huet clearly disagreed with
Descartes’s conclusions, he also perceived the Cartesians as an arrogant and
presumptuous sect.
Huet’s most essential criticism is that “Descartes, caught in an obvious
contradiction and inconsistency of views, abandons his previous doubt and, misusing its
advantages to the benefit of his philosophy, he pretends to pretend.” 48 For Huet,
Descartes did not feign doubt, but rather pretended to pretend to doubt, and only feigned
his escape from the hyperbolic doubt. Thus, Huet perceived that the entire Cartesian
system was based on intellectual dishonesty, as it pretended to escape an inexorable state
46
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of doubt. Huet recognized Cartesianism not only as dogmatism, but as a dogmatism that
is aware of its inherent falsity: Descartes was conscious of the fact that his dogmatic
system did not rest upon solid ground, yet he dissimulated this awareness by pretending
to be entirely confident of the foundations of his philosophy. It is this perceived vanity,
arrogance, and pretension in the philosophy of Descartes that most offended Huet.
Huet perceived a duplicitous calculation in the feigned ignorance of Descartes. He
dedicated the last part of his conclusion to the Censura to explaining this calculation. For
Huet, Descartes falsely claimed to be unfamiliar with ancient philosophy in order to
appear to his audience as a novel philosopher, while appropriating and disguising
arguments from ancient philosophies. Huet identified the horrific consequence of this
claim, arguing that Descartes’s disciples genuinely followed these principles and
neglected both literature and philological scholarship, pursuits dear to Huet. 49 Thus, he
sought to deny his opponent any originality by meticulously pointing out each instance
where Descartes appropriated previously formulated philosophical arguments. For
instance, Huet claimed that the proposition of beginning all philosophy with doubt has
been advanced by the skeptics, by Aristotle, and by Augustine. Similarly, the argument “I
am thinking, therefore I exist” has been employed by Augustine in The City of God. 50
Huet thus argued that most of Descartes’s arguments have been essentially plagiarized
and present no philosophical novelty.
Although the Aristotelian Scholastics could just as easily be classified as
dogmatists, there are several reasons why Huet did not attack them openly. First, many of
Huet’s friends and colleagues happened to be Aristotelians. An open censure of
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Aristotelian Scholasticism would have entailed political suicide for Huet, ending his
career. Thus, Descartes was the most convenient target. Second, although Aristotelian
Scholasticism remained entrenched in the universities, Cartesianism continued to make a
bold advance in French intellectual life. Third, Descartes’s belief in the existence of
innate knowledge and his epistemological commitment to rationalism and to a priori
reasoning made him the most obvious opponent. Fourth, the pretension Huet perceived in
the confidence of the Cartesians made their sect a clear target for a philosopher
attempting to defeat the presumption of the dogmatists.
Nicholas Malebranche, who was the best-known disciple of the Cartesian school,
received a similar reaction from Huet after publishing the De la recherche de la vérité
(Concerning the Search after Truth) in 1674. Huet’s own copy of the work, available at
the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, contains a page of comments on the inside of the
cover. After giving the work cursory praise for its acuteness, discernment, reflection, and
eloquence, Huet commenced an entire page of criticism: “But all of this is corrupted by
excessive presumption, pride, and impudence.” 51
Lennon gives a great deal of attention to Huet’s reception of Malebranche’s work.
In fact, he argues that the “pride, vanity, and arrogance” Huet perceived in Malebranche’s
De la recherche de la Vérité gave birth to his anti-Cartesianism. 52 Lennon claims that
Huet employed skepticism as a tactic against Descartes and his followers. Lennon
specifically refers to the “skeptical ridicule” of the Nouveaux mémoires, which he argues
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was written as a deserving response to the “pride, vanity, and arrogance” of Cartesian
dogmatism. 53
Lennon’s interpretation of “pride, vanity, and arrogance” is problematic because
he believes that Huet was most deeply offended by the Cartesian ridicule and dismissal of
all humanist disciplines, such as history, geography, philology. Consequently, Lennon
argues that the production of Huet’s Censura was spurned by a bitter personal animosity
towards the Cartesian disdain for the humanist tradition. In other words, the conflict
between Huet and Descartes was an interdisciplinary quarrel, as the reputation and the
relevance of entire intellectual fields are at stake. This interpretation is very similar to one
advanced by nineteenth-century historian Christian Bartholmèss, who also argues that
Huet was motivated by “the unjust disdain of that philosopher [Descartes] for memories,
languages, traditions, for all that with which the historian occupies himself.” 54 Like
Lennon, Bartholmèss interprets Huet’s aversion to skepticism as a personal animosity and
argues that skepticism was more of a means than an end for Huet. 55
Although these arguments seem cogent, they exaggerate the importance of Huet’s
personal animosity toward the Cartesian disdain for the humanities. Thus, the scholars
suggest that Huet’s entire rejection of Cartesianism was motivated by interdisciplinary
insults. Shelford, however, argues that Huet sought to settle the interdisciplinary quarrel
as early as 1679, when he published the Demonstratio Evangelica. She suggests that in
writing the work, Huet accepted the Cartesian challenge of providing demonstrative proof
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of the Christian religion and sought to equate demonstrative proofs with moral ones. 56 In
undertaking this challenge, Huet began by subjecting all geometric principles to intense
scrutiny. This was a way of undermining Cartesian criteria by challenging a discipline
that the Cartesians regarded as one that led to greatest certainty. Shelford claims that
Huet’s critique of geometrical demonstrations and axioms for their lack of clarity in
definitions of terms, such as line, point, and extension was modeled on Sextus Empiricus’
Against the Geometers. 57 Having concluded this critique, Huet proceeded to provide a
proof of the Christian religion employing a “geometrized” account of prophecies and
their fulfillments. 58
Ultimately, Huet aimed to show that historical or moral demonstrations contained
as much certainty as geometrical ones, and that geometric definitions were not as clear as
they appeared to be. 59 In fact, Huet suggested that where the demonstration of the truth of
the Christian religion was concerned, historical criteria based on divine Scripture were
both clearer than and superior to geometric definitions in validating the truth of the
Christian religion. 60 Thus, Huet the humanist attempted to show that philology, Biblical
exegesis, and history were far more relevant to interpreting the truth of the Scriptures
than abstract metaphysical formulations.
Such a rebuttal of both Descartes’s and Malebranche’s ridicule of the humanities
seems like an adequate expression of the humanist bitterness toward the arrogance of the
geometrizing Cartesians described by Lennon. Lennon correctly indicates that the
Nouveaux mémoires pour servir à l’histoire du Cartesianisme can be interpreted as a
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ridicule in response to the “pride, arrogance, and vanity” of the Cartesian philosophy.61
However, he goes further to suggest that Huet’s personal bitterness “gave birth to the
Censura.” 62
Such an interpretation inherently exaggerates the role of Huet’s personal
resentment against the Cartesians in the formation of the Censura. After all, the Censura
is a deeply philosophical work that is addressed to learned audience, as it is first
published in Latin. Huet engaged in meticulous refutations that involved arcane
terminology and assumed that his audience was cognizant of the references to ancient
philosophers. On the other hand, the Nouveaux mémoires was published solely in French
and addressed a more popular audience, given its satirical genre. Thus, while the
Demonstratio Evangelica defended the stature of the humanities among the learned
audiences, the Nouveaux mémoires served as a popular ridicule of Cartesianism. Unlike
these works, the Censura focused on presenting the main philosophical weaknesses of the
Cartesian system and defeating the Cartesians in purely philosophical terms.
Another problem with Lennon’s interpretation is its chronological inaccuracy.
Lennon argues in two separate articles that Huet’s rejection of Cartesianism can be dated
to 1674, when he read Malebranche’s Recherche for the first time. 63 However, Huet’s
correspondence indicates that he first contemplated composing a treatise against
Cartesian philosophy as early as 1666. 64 Furthermore, it has already been established that
Huet’s interactions with Cormis and his subsequent commitment to skepticism took place
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around 1660. 65 Thus, while Malebranche’s work may have further embittered Huet, his
intellectual criticisms would have already been formulated.
By failing to date Huet’s intellectual commitment skepticism accurately, Lennon
fails to acknowledge a progression in Huet’s increasingly explicit exposition of
skepticism. In the Demonstratio Evangelica Huet modeled his refutation of geometric
certainty on Sextus Empiricus, thereby subtly advancing a skeptical influence under the
veil of humanism. By the time of the Censura, Huet’s skepticism became more apparent
in the arguments about the criterion of truth and in the defense of the skeptical causes of
doubt. The Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, which will be more
extensively discussed in the following chapter, exposed the fideistic side of Huet’s
skepticism. In this text, Huet sought to establish a hierarchy between faith and reason,
whereby reason would become subjected to faith and would refrain from infringing upon
its domain in all theological questions. While reason would maintain an autonomous
ability to philosophize, its utility was deeply questioned.
Bartholmèss’s and Lennon’s neglect of the correspondence also leads them to
reject the sincerity of Huet’s skepticism. Bartholomèss refuses to acknowledge Huet as a
skeptic, instead classifying Huet as a Christian dogmatist who employs skepticism to
preserve the faith. 66 Although Lennon’s interpretation is not so categorical, he does not
accurately analyze the skepticism inherent in Huet’s critique of Descartes. By concluding
his article on Malebranche and Huet with a cursory mention of Huet’s “skeptical
ridicule” Lennon neglects to describe the process by which Huet’s aversion to

65

Bartholmèss, 51; and BN Ms. Lat., 11432, fol. 101-102 Huet to Mambrun, 16 November 1660. (Quoted
and translated in Shelford, “Thinking Geometrically in Pierre-Daniel Huet’s Demonstratio Evangelica
(1679),” 609).
66
Bartholmèss, 132 and 173.

66

Cartesianism drove him to formulate skeptical arguments. 67 Bartholmèss goes deeper
than Lennon in analyzing Huet’s skepticism as a tactic, claiming that skepticism’s main
force was the negative dialectic that reduced all Cartesian arguments to absurdity.68
However, by refusing to consider Huet as a sincere skeptic, Lennon and Bartholmèss
seem to disregard the philosophical stakes of the argument between the skeptics and the
Cartesians.
Given the inadequacy of these interpretations, the combination of “pride, vanity,
and arrogance” [“presumption, “pride,” and “impudence” are the words used by Huet]
could be interpreted as a criticism that goes much deeper than personal animosity. Huet’s
aversion to Descartes’s clever dissimulation of doubt certainly comes to mind. Consider
the following part of the commentary:
His meditations, instead of curing his prejudices and arming him against verisimilitudes
according to his own precepts, made him take up extravagant visions, mad conjectures,
and suppositions much more uncertain than those he fought against. 69

Unlike Descartes, Malebranche did not even attempt to suspend his judgment and remove
his prejudices. However, in Huet’s view, Malebranche emulated Descartes in having
constructed an absolutely false system based on the most uncertain principles. The
obvious weakness of Malebranche’s and Descartes’s principles doubly offended Huet by
combining presumption with the awareness of error. Both were, for Huet, authors of
imaginary dogmatic systems that affronted reason by their obvious fallacies.
Contrary to Lennon’s argument, Huet’s condemnation of Descartes and
Malebranche went beyond personal animosity. Although Huet was offended by the
67
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Cartesian ridicule of the humanities, it would seem strange that he would dedicate the
Censura, the Nouveaux mémoires, the Traité, and arguably the Demonstratio Evangelica
along with the Alnetanae quaestiones to repudiating Cartesian principles. Rather, his
aversion to Cartesianism stemmed from deep theological and philosophical
disagreements.
Kors offers another interpretation of Huet’s anti-Cartesianism and skepticism. He
gives particular attention to Huet’s early commitment to Cartesianism and offers the view
that Huet’s “fall from Cartesian certainty began an odyssey that ended in fideism.” 70
Such an interpretation fails to acknowledge Huet’s early embrace of skepticism because it
suggests that Huet rejected Cartesianism significantly before embracing skepticism.
Although Kors’s interpretation does not accurately date Huet’s skepticism, it provides an
original interpretation of the tension between reason and faith. Kors claims that Huet’s
position was, in a way, an intellectual retreat from the ferocity of the religious debates of
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 71 He suggests that while Huet was not
initially averse to dogmatism, his participation in the endless sequence of proofs and
disputations of proofs of the existence of God led him to reject the very possibility of
rationally proving the existence of God. The appeal of fideistic skepticism lay in its
ability to peacefully resolve the disputes about the existence of God without an engaging
in an inexorable cycle of proofs, objections, and objections to objections, ad infinitum.
Although Bartholmèss does not qualify Huet as a skeptic, he nevertheless
perceives the seemingly logical progression from Huet’s earlier works to the Traité. He
suggests that Huet’s skeptical oeuvre was nothing but an extreme consequence and frank
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application of explicit and implicit principles, proposed in his earlier works. 72 He sees
great similarity between the structure, the narrative frame, and the arguments of the
Alnetanae quaestiones and the Traité. Bartholmèss points out that in both works Huet
aimed to destabilize reliance on reason as a means to certitude. He argues that the
common goal of both works was to preserve the faith and the revealed dogma by
reducing the human reliance of reason, thereby rendering Christian dogma the only
source of certainty. 73
In describing the consequences of the Cartesian philosophical revolution, Popkin
argues that the “application of Cartesian methodology and the Cartesian standard of true
philosophical and scientific knowledge to the evaluation of religious knowledge” was
perhaps the major factor in the development of irreligion in the seventeenth century. 74 He
then describes a subsequent rejection of the Cartesian principles by those who wished to
preserve Biblical texts from being evaluated by the Cartesian standards. Huet’s
categorical rejection of Descartes’s rationalist methods and aims certainly seems to fit
this description.
Consider Huet’s own view of how Descartes’s intellectual presumption enervated
religious authority:
Descartes yet had such confidence in his views that he declared that nothing should be
accepted as true that was not clearer and more certain that the demonstrations of
geometers, that his views were so evident and certain that they would, if properly
understood, remove all ground for dispute, and finally that the things of nature could
spring from no other causes than those proposed by him…And this presumptuousness of
Descartes has led the Cartesians into such unbridled and precipitate temerity that no one
from this grandiloquent sect blushes to write that whatever they know must be true. 75
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Descartes and the Cartesians represented, for Huet, the ultimate expression of dogmatism
in his age. The confidence with which Descartes advanced his views deified him and
rendered him an infallible authority in all matters philosophical and theological. In fact,
Descartes had such audacity that “he dared to compare the truth of his opinions with the
truth of the dogmas of the faith, asserting that they necessarily agree with each other, and
that those argued for by him in philosophy cannot be contrary to those of theology unless
theology contradicts the light of reason.” 76 Thus, for Huet, Descartes not only presented
an erroneous doctrine, but had the impudence to compare its certainty to divine sources
of knowledge.
This comment is crucial because it clearly reveals Huet’s own perception of the
stakes of the debate. If Descartes were able to erect a philosophical system that dictated
certain knowledge claiming that the intellectual certainty of his principles are equivalent
to those of divine revelation, then he would inherently undermine the principles of the
faith. Huet took all human certainty to be far below the level of divine certainty. 77 Thus,
even if human certainty were attainable by reason, it would only faintly resemble divine
truth and would most certainly never contradict it. 78 To suggest, as Descartes does, that
the relationship was reversed, that the principles of divine theology should be subjected
to the standard of human reason was pure and simple heresy, in Huet’s view.
***
Herein lies the birth of Huet’s skepticism. Huet was able to perceive the withering
away of established philosophical and theological authorities in light of fierce intellectual
debates. These debates inherently enervated the intellectual stability that has so far been
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provided by incontestable intellectual authorities. Perhaps Huet was able to foresee the
irreparable damage that philosophical and theological contests for intellectual authority
would bring to the stability of religious traditions in the Enlightenment. Thus, Huet’s aim
was to defend the faith against the onslaught of rational critiques of revealed truths. The
strategy consisted in defeating the intellectual confidence of dogmatists like Descartes by
stressing the fallibility of human reason.
As will be shown in the following chapter, Huet’s fideism was responsible for the
formation of his philosophical skepticism. In arguing that skeptical philosophy was most
effective in leading people to agree to the truths of Christianity, Huet revealed his
understanding of the potential danger of submitting revealed truths to the undiscerning
examination of reason. When faced with the extreme dogmatism of Descartes, Huet had
to undermine the rationalist effort. Consequently, he began to formulate a more refined
version of skepticism that combined a pessimistic view of the abilities of human
understanding with an unshakeable faith in the truth of the Christian doctrine. Thus,
while the rejection of Cartesian principles may not be the root cause of Huet’s skepticism,
the audacity he perceived in Descartes and his disciples certainly radicalized Huet’s own
perspectives.
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Chapter 3: “It Is Certain Because It Is Impossible”
Having considered Pierre-Daniel Huet’s biographical and philosophical
motivations for adopting philosophical skepticism, the thesis will now turn to the
religious dimension of Huet’s thought, which, as will be demonstrated, was the most
crucial factor in the formation of his skepticism. Huet’s skepticism developed as a
defense against the rationalist revolution of his age that threatened to challenge all
supernatural theological doctrines with an indiscriminate appeal to naturalistic logical
explanations. Consequently, Huet denounced the powers of reason and argued that the
human mind was weak in order to convince his audience that there was only one source
of true and certain knowledge: faith in supernatural revelation. Huet’s skepticism was,
above all, religious in its nature and purpose. While this may seem an idiosyncratic
position, Huet’s skeptical fideism was, in fact, neither singular nor surprising, and, in
context, Huet’s seemingly contradictory positions, from critic of Descartes to the author
of the Traité, were essentially consistent.
To demonstrate this consistency and continuity, this chapter will show how
Huet’s Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei presents the logical link
between his anti-Cartesianism and his skepticism. While the Censura explicitly refuted
the tenets of one particular philosophical system, it implicitly denounced the presumption
of reason. The Quaestiones, in turn, relegated reason to a concomitant position with
respect to faith. Finally, the Traité struck the lethal blow to the foundations of reason,
demonstrating its utter inability to know anything with certainty.
***
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To understand the context in which the fideistic movement became appealing in
seventeenth-century France, we must look back a century and a half to the Lateran
Council of 1513. Prior to this council, some of the major axioms of Christianity, such as
the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, were considered as preambles to,
rather than articles of, the faith. A group of Italian philosophers, known as the Paduan
Averroists, claimed that neither the existence of God nor the immortality of the soul
could be demonstrated by natural human reason; for them, faith was the sole source of
such knowledge. 1 The arguments at stake concerned neither the actual existence of God
nor the immortality of the soul, but rather the human ability to know such things with
certainty by the use of natural reason.
In response to such potentially dangerous claims, the Fifth Lateran Council
declared the existence of God and the immortality of the soul to be naturally
demonstrable, which made it an article of the faith that such natural demonstrations were
compelling. The fifth session of the Council, in effect, made fideism on such issues
heretical:
And since truth cannot contradict truth, we define that every statement contrary to the
enlightened truth of the faith is totally false and we strictly forbid teaching otherwise to
be permitted. We decree that all those who cling to erroneous statements of this kind,
thus sowing heresies which are wholly condemned, should be avoided in every way and
punished as detestable and odious heretics and infidels who are undermining the catholic
faith. 2
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The Council further restricted philosophers from deviating in any way “from the true
faith” in any principles or conclusions they present to the public. Furthermore, all
philosophers were obligated to “devote their every effort to clarify for their listeners the
truth of the Christian religion.” 3 Finally, the Council sought to undermine future
challenges to the authority of the Church, by limiting the study of philosophy to five
years and allowing scholars to pursue further study of philosophy only if they
simultaneously studied theology.
The intention of this decision was to prevent any possible challenges to the
orthodox positions of the Catholic Church. While the Council intended to reduce the
controversy and debates surrounding the articles of Christianity, its decrees inadvertently
generated an increasingly heated series of debates. For if the existence of God were
demonstrable by natural human reason, then there could be “no greater task in philosophy
than assiduously to seek out, once for all, the best of all these arguments and to lay them
out so precisely and plainly that, henceforth all will take them to be true and precise
demonstrations.” 4
This latter passage is taken from René Descartes’s letter to the Faculty of
Theology in Paris more than a century later. Written as a dedication to his Meditations,
this letter identified the unintended consequences of the Lateran Council. If philosophers
could not dispute the veracity of Church doctrines, they would debate the best ways of
demonstrating the accuracy of those doctrines.
Thus, the intellectual world of seventeenth-century France was plunged into an
inexorable series of debates about and demonstrations of the existence of God. The
3
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Aristotelian Scholastics, who generally referred to St. Thomas Aquinas’s five traditional
proofs, stood on one side of the debate. The first proof, from motion, claimed that the
existence of motion in the universe indicated the necessary existence of a First Mover.
The second proof claimed that the “sequence of dependent cause and effect” in the
surrounding world, necessitated the existence of a First Cause. The third proof argued
that the contingency of all living things required the existence of a Necessary Being. The
fourth proof, from degrees of perfection, advanced that from the degrees of perfection in
finite things, the existence of a Supremely Perfect being could be inferred. Finally, the
fifth proof argued that the order and harmony of the world demonstrated the existence of
a Benevolent and Providential Being, who governed the world. 5
All of the Aristotelian proofs in their Thomistic form applied to a posteriori
demonstration, since they relied on observations about the external world and from these
observations inferred the existence of God. Thus, the Aristotelian Scholastics were
committed to an empirical epistemology, believing that “nothing entered the mind except
by way of the senses.” 6 The Cartesian proofs stood in direct opposition to and challenged
the Scholastic epistemology, attempting to demonstrate the existence of God a priori,
without reference to evidence beyond the mind itself.
Descartes based his first proof of God on the fact that he possessed a clear and
distinct idea of a “supreme deity, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of
all things.” 7 He argued that an idea of an infinite being had to possess more objective
reality than ideas of finite substances. There could not be more objective being in an idea
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than in its cause. “Hence it follows that something cannot come into being out of nothing,
and also that what is more perfect…cannot come into being from what is less perfect.” 8
Since the idea of God was infinite, but man’s mind merely finite, Descartes concluded
that there could be no other source of the idea of God than “a certain substance that is
infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and supremely powerful, and that created me
along with everything else that exists.” 9 Descartes’s first proof God was entirely a priori,
since it did not refer to any empirical evidence outside the mind. Consequently, this
knowledge was, according to Descartes, innate in all human beings. 10
Descartes’s second proof relied on his view of the nature of ideas. If one could
form a clear and distinct idea of something in the mind, it followed that one could clearly
and distinctly perceive all the things that belonged to that idea. For instance, one could
only conceive of a unicorn as having one horn and of a triangle as having three angles.
Since the idea of God was of a supremely perfect being, He must have all the attributes of
perfection, including necessary existence. Descartes claimed that if the property of
existence were removed from the idea of God, then He would no longer be perfect. Thus,
“from the fact that I cannot think of God except as existing, it follows that existence is
inseparable from God, and for this reason he really exists.” 11 The non-existence of a
perfect being was a logical impossibility, a self-contradiction.
For the Cartesians, Descartes’s proofs were convincing because they did not rely
on man’s feeble senses, but, rather, deduced the existence of God from first principles.12
The Scholastics, on the other hand, considered Cartesian proofs as “dangerous for their
8
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weakness” and argued that Descartes had relied on misguided epistemological methods. 13
Both philosophical schools continued to devise their own demonstrations, while refuting
their opponents. What was at stake was not so much the existence of God as the battle for
supremacy in the learned world. A philosophical system’s ability to demonstrate
irrefutably the existence of God would ensure its superiority in the intellectual world of
seventeenth-century France. Ironically, each school’s inability to present a conclusive
proof coupled with an unwillingness to surrender to its opponents perpetuated debates
regarding the existence of God into the eighteenth century, compounding refutation upon
refutation, objection upon objection.
Huet’s Censura presents one such set of refutations of Descartes’s two proofs of
God. In the manuscript version of the Censura, Huet wrote that he planned to “examine
Descartes’ argument, or to better say, joke, concerning the existence of God.” 14 Huet’s
refutation identified Descartes’s proof as insincere, but treated the Cartesian argument
with full philosophical seriousness.
Having summarized Descartes’s two proofs, Huet addressed his opponent’s view
of the idea of an infinite and supremely perfect being: “For, if this idea is not of a
different nature than our other ideas, its source cannot be necessarily attributed to an
infinite and supremely perfect cause.” 15 Consequently, Huet argued that Descartes’s use
of the term “idea” was ambiguous, because it could refer both to the action of the
thinking mind and to the object of a thought. Furthermore, he claimed that “our idea of an
infinite and supremely perfect being, is itself finite and imperfect” although “Descartes
13

Ibid., 301.
BN Ms. Fr., 14702, fol. 28. « L’ordre que nous nous sommes presenté nous engage maintenant a
examiner le raisonnement ou pour mieus dire la Plaisanterie de Des Cartes sur l’existence de Dieu.»
15
Ibid., fol. 28 verso. « Car si elle n’est pas d’une autre nature que nos autres idées il n’est point du tout
necessaire de remonter a une cause infinie & souverainement parfaite. »
14

77

would have us believe that this idea is so excellent and elevated that it not only far
surpasses the perfection of our soul, but that it could only be derived from God.” 16 For
Huet, Descartes was inconsistent in attributing reliability to the human idea of infinity.
Descartes, in his critic’s view, defeated his own argument by suggesting that man can
only conceive of infinity “negatively” (knowing what it is not), but not “positively”
(knowing what it is). Huet argued that such reasoning showed that our idea of God was
clearly finite and, thus, could not serve as the basis for the alleged Cartesian “proof.”
For Huet, since our idea of God was finite, it was necessarily and categorically
different from God. Being imperfect, our idea could not reflect accurately the nature of a
supremely perfect being. Consequently, this idea was neither a clear nor a distinct idea of
God. 17 In addition, Huet demonstrated that Descartes’s errors were not only
philosophical, but theological in nature. He presented Scriptural passages describing the
inability of human understanding to conceive properly of God, further deconstructing
Descartes’s notion of a clear and distinct idea of God. Huet concluded that if no such
clear idea of God existed, then its source could not be attributed necessarily to any
supremely perfect being.
Having thus disposed of the first Cartesian proof, Huet assailed the proof from
necessary existence. Huet conceded that, in theory, a perfect being could not lack the
property of existence. However, to combat the Cartesian argument Huet advanced a
metaphysical claim that divided all things into two categories:
There are then two sorts of beings: beings that depend entirely on the mind, do not exist
outside the mind, and are purely fictitious; and beings that actually exist, subsisting
16
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independently of thought in the nature of things. The former are in the terms of the
schools said to be solely mental, while the latter – real. 18

Thus, Descartes’s infinite and supremely perfect being could be guaranteed only mental
existence. 19 The presence of a supremely perfect being in the mind could not, in itself,
necessitate the existence of such a being in the real world. It could only testify to the
necessary existence of such an idea in the mind:
From this it is obvious that this objective reality, which according to Descartes exists in
the idea of an infinite and supremely perfect thing, is entirely inside our mind, and in no
way depends on the thing which it represents. 20

Having relegated the Cartesian proofs to an idealist level of certainty, Huet
achieved his aim and showed that the Cartesian God did not exist necessarily in the realm
of objective reality. Huet’s refutation not only explicitly rejected the Cartesian proofs of
God, but implicitly challenged the theological value of such demonstrations. While Huet
displayed the inadequacy of applying a priori reason to supernatural knowledge in the
Censura he openly articulated this view in the Traité, arguing that natural human reason
was a weak and inappropriate source of knowledge. Huet cited St. Thomas Aquinas:
Things which may be proved demonstratively, as the being of God, the Unity of the
Godhead, and other Points, are placed among Articles we are to believe, because previous
to other things that are of Faith: and these must be presupposed at least by such as to have
no Demonstration of them. 21
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The implication of Huet’s citation opposed the view of the Lateran Council regarding the
necessity of accepting the demonstrability of the existence of God and of other former
preambles to the articles of the faith. In Huet’s view, rational arguments on behalf of the
existence of God inadvertently undermined faith in God. He perceived Descartes’s
arguments as both insincere and weak. Since the proofs were so easy to overturn, they
inadequately defended the most crucial position in Christianity. The longer such debates
were to continue, the more speculative the defenses of the existence of God would
become.
Thus, Huet approached the refutation of Descartes’s proofs from several
perspectives. First, he was advancing answers against specific dogmatic claims about the
real nature of things. Second, Huet was implicitly advancing a skeptical view by
demonstrating the weakness of human reason. Third, he was identifying with the fideist
position, which claimed that the existence of God could not be demonstrated by natural
human reason. Such knowledge was accessible only through Christian faith.
The fideist position became increasingly appealing as a withdrawal from the
intense theological quarrel between the Cartesians and the Aristotelians.22 The fideists
did not wish to enter the debate on the terms of the Lateran Council. Instead of accepting
the claim that the existence of God and the immortality of the soul were demonstrable by
reason, they argued, like the Paduan Averroists, that both of these claims were not
knowable by natural human reason, but could be ensured solely through submission to
faith in the supernatural revelations. Tertullian (c. 155-230) has generally been identified
as the first proto-fideist, for his having described Christ’s death in the following way:
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“The Son of God died: it is immediately credible--because it is foolish. / He was buried,
and rose again: it is certain--because it is impossible” 23
The scholarly use of the word “fideism” points to another interesting aspect of
Huet’s thought. The term itself was coined in the nineteenth century to identify a
movement known within Catholicism as traditionalism, which stood in opposition to
rationalism. The traditionalists believed that all divine revelation was communicated
solely through tradition. Thus, they thought that if traditional interpretations of Scripture
were abandoned, human access to the truths of the Christian Revelation would be lost. 24
Huet’s deep interest in ancient texts, his obsession with philology, and his
antiquarianism come to mind. If we consider his career, it would be difficult to conclude
that he believed that all scholarly pursuits should be abandoned. At the same time, he
denounced man’s reason for its weakness. He advocated the suspension of judgment in
contentious questions while devoting his whole life to scholarship. The paradox can be
resolved best with two possibilities. Either Huet believed his scholarly pursuits to be
meaningless, but, nevertheless, continued them, or he thought that his erudite interests in
antiquity were the only ones relevant to the attainment of wisdom in man’s fallen state.
The latter explanation sheds light on Huet’s motivations for writing the
Demonstratio Evangelica. He thought that the truth of Christianity could only be made
convincing with reference to antiquity, a method that would reinforce faith in the
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Christian revelation. Huet also likely believed that the submission to faith in the Christian
tradition in all matters theological could consolidate the contentious Catholic community.
French fideists were most concerned with proving two specific claims: that
human beings were incapable of knowing anything about the real world with certainty
through natural human reason; and that human beings should, consequently, accept faith
in revelation as the sole source of reliable knowledge. The second point, being more
significant for the fideists, was necessarily contingent on the first. Consequently, many
fideists attempted to demonstrate the uncertainty of natural human knowledge about the
real world. The fideists argued against the usefulness of natural philosophy, contrary to
the growing confidence in the abilities of the human mind visible in the Cartesian and the
Baconian revolutions in France and Great Britain, respectively.
The early and prominent French fideistic skeptic François de La Mothe Le Vayer
inherited the “mantle” of skepticism from Montaigne, according to Richard Popkin.
Popkin describes La Mothe Le Vayer’s skeptical corpus as “predominantly illustrative,”
in the sense that his work provided examples of the usefulness and virtues of skepticism,
rather than formulating positive theoretical claims about its advantages. 25
In the Opuscule ou Petit Traité Sceptique sur cette Façon de Parler, N’avoir pas
le Sens Commun (Opuscule or The Little Skeptical Treatise on the Way of Speaking
Without Common Sense – 1646), La Mothe Le Vayer questioned the human ability to
know with certainty any natural truths about the real world, given the fallibility of the
senses, the human inability to recognize the truth, and the absence of any criteria of
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truth. 26 Consequently, man could not obtain an objective knowledge of the real world,
but could only know the world subjectively and imperfectly. In the Sololiques Sceptiques
(Skeptical Soliloquies – 1670), La Mothe Le Vayer denied that man was a rational
animal, claiming instead that man was an “animal desiring knowledge” but never able to
attain it. 27
Thus, as he claimed in the Discours pour montrer que les Doutes de la
Philosophie Sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences (A Discourse
Demonstrating that the Doubts of Skeptical Philosophy Are of Great Use to the Sciences
– 1668), Pyrrhonism would convince mankind of the uselessness of inquiry and debates
in natural philosophy. 28 It would also demonstrate the lack of absolute truth within the
framework of human knowledge:
In fact, the general system [of human knowledge] is composed of logic, physics, and
morals, from which all human knowledge borrows that which it considers most
important; [this system] is nothing but a collection of opinions contested by those who
have time to examine them in depth. 29

Moving against the intellectual current of the seventeenth century, La Mothe Le Vayer
opposed the increased attention given to natural philosophy following the Baconian and
the Cartesian revolutions.
Pierre Bayle, the most widely read controversialist of the late seventeenth century,
was the most influential fideist of his time in both Catholic and Protestant Europe. Like
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La Mothe Le Vayer, he propagated doubts about the abilities of natural human reason. At
the same time, Bayle employed a unique rhetorical method. Instead of openly asserting
the weakness of human reason, his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (Historical and
Critical Dictionary – 1697) presented paradoxes and contradictions that plagued the most
basic human assumptions about the surrounding world.
In some cases, Bayle questioned contemporaneous advances in natural
philosophy. In the article on “Zeno of Elea,” Bayle offered an overview of the debate
regarding the existence of the vacuum. Having challenged the most commonly accepted
notions of substance, extension, and motion, Bayle wrote: “Our Zeno would be much
more formidable today than he was in his own time. It can no longer be doubted, he
would say, that if there were a total plenum, motion would be impossible.” 30 Bayle was
not concerned with resolving the dispute regarding the existence of the vacuum. Rather,
he sought to demonstrate the multiplicity of controversies and inconsistencies that
surrounded the most widely accepted views of physics itself.
In the second place, the fideists applied the conclusions drawn from their first
principle to make an epistemological assumption that, given man’s feeble reason and
senses, mankind should accept faith in revelation as the only source of true and certain
knowledge. Thus, in addition to saving man from an inexorable search for truth,
skepticism was, for La Mothe Le Vayer, useful for religion:
Those who have possess humility and ignorance, at all times, are much better
accommodated [to receive the supernatural lights of faith] than those who are in spiritual
darkness. The dogmatists, on the contrary, have never had a stronger concern than to
make others appear to not know something, became uncontrollably lost [in spiritual
things], and their presumption to have enough light of the understanding to overcome
every manner of obscurity causes them to blind themselves in proposing that they believe
30
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that they are advancing into the darkness that human nature cannot penetrate. I find that
Skepticism is of no little use to a Christian soul, because it makes the soul surrender all
those magisterial opinions that are so strongly detested by St. Paul. 31

La Mothe Le Vayer judged that through total skepticism mankind could attain perfect
reconciliation with Christianity. He compared the soul of a Christian skeptic to “a field
cleared and cleansed of bad plants, such as the dangerous axioms of an infinity of learned
persons, which then receives the dew drops of divine grace much more happily.” 32 A
skeptic’s mind, according to Le Vayer, would not hold any opinions contrary to the true
faith, because the mind will have accepted its inability to know anything with certainty
by natural human reason. Having accepted the weakness and irrelevance of reason, the
soul will turn to faith in revelation for certainty.
The mathematician and Jansenist apologist, Blaise Pascal, who was one of the
most prominent fideists of his time, expressed attitudes similar to that of La Mothe Le
Vayer’s in his collection of Pensées (1670), arranged by his Jansenist friends for
posthumous publication. A mathematical prodigy, Pascal became disillusioned with
mathematics and natural philosophy and turned to the order of Jansenists. Named after
Flemish theologian Cornelius Otto Jansen (1585-1638), the Jansenists were a
controversial Catholic movement. Far more than the Thomists, they emphasized the dire
consequences of man’s fall from grace and believed that no human action on earth,
independently of the grace of God, could adequately rectify man’s fallen state.
31
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Unlike Huet, who demonstrated the futility and the weakness of rational proofs of
the existence of God through his refutations of the Cartesian proofs of God, Pascal
explicitly denounced all such “metaphysical” attempts because they were, in his words:
So remote from human reasoning and so involved that they make little impact, and, even
if they did help some people, it would be only for the moment during which they watched
the demonstration, because an hour later they would be afraid they had made a mistake. 33

Instead of a metaphysical proof of the existence of a supreme being, Pascal proposed a
wager. In attempting to answer whether or not God exists, man can make two choices. If
he chooses to believe that God does not exist, two outcomes are possible. If he is correct,
he wins nothing, since no afterlife exists; but if he is wrong he loses everything, and is
doomed to hell for eternity. If, on the other hand, man believes that God exists the two
possible outcomes become significantly more favorable: if he is right, he wins
everything, but if he is wrong, he loses nothing. 34 Pascal’s wager is not a proof, but rather
an incitement to believe. Pascal maintained that such an argument would be more
convincing, more effective, and more appealing than obscure metaphysical
demonstrations, because faith was “God perceived by the heart, not by the reason.” 35
Pascal also claimed that “faith is different from proof. [The latter] is human and
the [former] a gift of God.” 36 He warned about submitting religious doctrines to the
scrutiny of natural reason, claiming that the Christian “religion will be left with nothing
mysterious or supernatural.” 37 Without such elements, Christianity would, in Pascal’s
view, lose its most essential feature.
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Bayle was similarly concerned with an overly rationalist approach to theology. In
his article on “King David,” Bayle painted a disturbing picture of a revered biblical
figure, described in Scripture as a murderer and an adulterer. At the same time, Bayle
noted, Scripture claimed that David was beloved by God, which meant that all his earthly
sins did not prevent David from being accepted into heaven. 38 Bayle used this
paradoxical situation to reinforce the incomprehensibility to human intelligence of God’s
judgments and ways.
Although Bayle began his article on “Pyrrho” by claiming that Pyrrhonism was
dangerous to theology and religion, he concluded on a very different note:
Our reason is a path that leads us astray since, when it displays itself with the greatest
subtlety, it plunges us into such an abyss. The natural conclusion of this ought to be to
renounce this guide and to implore the cause of all things to give us a better one. This is a
great step toward the Christian religion; for it requires that we look to God for knowledge
of what we ought to believe and what we ought to do, and that we enslave our
understanding to the obeisance of faith. If a man is convinced that nothing good is to be
expected from his philosophical inquiries, he will be more disposed to pray to God to
persuade him of the truths that ought to be believed than if he flatters himself that he
might succeed by reasoning and disputing. 39

Bayle expressed the most fundamental fideistic argument and, at the same time, exposed
his intentions. Like Pascal and Le Mothe Le Vayer, Bayle believed that the most basic
tenets of Christianity had to be approached through faith and not through reasoning and
argument. In Bayle’s view, skepticism was useful for being able to demonstrate the
weakness of natural reason and, consequently, for leading man to find refuge in
supernatural belief. Thus, his aim in the Dictionary was to convince his readers of the
theological uselessness of philosophy and to guide them towards accepting faith.
Like La Mothe Le Vayer and Bayle, Pascal also desired to see reason cede to the
rule of faith. At the same time, he cited St. Augustine, claiming that “reason would never
38
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submit unless she perceived appropriate occasions to do so.” 40 Huet’s marginal note on
this passage in his copy of the Pensées is particularly revealing:
He supposes that this submission should depend on reason: but it seems to me on the
contrary, that to submit reason to faith is more of a feat of faith than of reason. Reason
and faith are equally imperious, and neither would ever agree to submit to the other,
unless it is done involuntarily, by violence and opposition. Therefore, one of the two
must defeat the other, and it is up to faith to make reason submit, not otherwise. 41

Huet’s analysis of Pascal reveals his own perception of reason. He envisioned that the
struggle between reason and faith went much further than that described by Pascal. For
Huet, reason had to be coaxed into submission, because it would never voluntarily accept
inferiority with respect to faith.
While it should not seem that La Mothe Le Vayer, Pascal, and Bayle are identical
thinkers, their fideism was based on similar principles. All three believed that natural
human reason was feeble and, therefore, incapable of discovering knowledge about the
surrounding natural world (and particularly about God). All three considered rational
proofs of the existence of God irrelevant to Christianity. Instead, they called upon
submission of reason to faith.
Huet also argued that the suspension of judgment in all philosophical questions
prepared “the Mind for the reception of divine Faith.” 42 He thought that if skepticism
were to be adopted as a philosophical attitude, it would prevent acerbic debates in natural
philosophy and, more importantly for Huet, in theology:
40
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Faith is a Gift that God is pleased to grant to them who trust not too much to the Strength
of Nature, presume not too far on the Penetration of their Reason, nor espouse their own
Sentiments with affected Obstinacy, but diligently prepare their minds to receive it. 43

Indeed, Huet’s concern with the relationship between faith and reason has received little
attention. His Alnetanae quaestiones de concordia rationis et fidei, however, reveals
Huet’s deep concern with the issue and definitively reconciles his skepticism and his
Catholic faith: 44
I undertook the discussion of the very difficult topic concerning the agreement of Reason
and Faith; or, what ought to be the province of reason in adopting faith; and how far the
empire of faith over reason ought to extend. 45

Reason, Huet wrote, was merely a faculty that assisted us in learning things, either by
perception or by reflection. 46 Faith, on the other hand, was a gift granted by God to
mankind. Faith alone could guarantee absolute truth. 47
Huet described a conflict between the two sources of knowledge. As in his note
on Pascal’s Pensées, Huet declared that reason, “when she is turbulent and commanding,
refuses to cede to other arbiters.” 48 The human mind thus becomes divided and turns to
“sedition and tumultuousness” never resting in peace. 49 Such peace, according to Huet,
could only be established under the guidance of faith, claiming that “she [reason] must
know herself, become aware of her weakness, and not aspire to give us happiness and
43
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eternal health, when we cannot even know truth through her.” 50 Huet believed that
natural human reason inhibited the reception of divine truth. This human faculty was
overly ambitious, discounting its own limitations and consistently attempting to exert its
rule over man, in natural and supernatural questions.
Consequently, Huet proposed that faith and reason should operate within different
domains. The former, he argued, should be concerned with all matters of religious belief.
Reason could operate autonomously, but should never be applied to matters of faith. 51
Conversely, faith would not interfere in questions of natural philosophy. 52 In such a state,
no conflict would exist between the two faculties, because each would be concerned with
a particular realm of knowledge. Huet’s system did not call for a complete elimination of
reliance on natural reason, but rather sought to establish a structural relationship, under
which reason would be in a position of obedience and subordination to things known by
faith.
Thus, Huet could defend supernatural truths without reference to abstract proofs:
“I believe that God is three in one, not because of reason, but because of the first revealed
truth.” 53 The supernatural world could coexist with the natural world. The division was
crucial, in Huet’s mind, to preventing scholars from attempting to discuss matters of faith
from a philosophical perspective. Cartesians and Aristotelians would no longer attempt to
prove truths that could be certain only through belief in revelation.
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The Quaestiones appeared, logically and temporally, between the Censura and the
Traité. While the Censura explicitly challenged only one particular philosophy, it
implicitly attacked the presumption of reason. The Quaestiones relegated reason to a
separate and unequal position with respect to faith. The Traité struck the final blow to
reason, demonstrating its utter feebleness.
Some modern historians have perceived the continuity in Huet’s works but have
not adequately analyzed the relationship between faith and reason in Huet’s philosophy.
Christian Bartholmèss claims that the Traité presented the extreme conclusions that
followed from the principles advanced in Huet’s two preceding works (the Censura and
the Quaestiones). 54 According to April Shelford, Huet declared his intention to make the
Traité the fourth book of the Quaestiones to Etienne Pirot (1631-1713), a Sorbonne
theologian and censor. 55 Historian Germain Malbreil argues that the Traité was supposed
to serve as the first book of the Quaestiones, because it would have logically paved the
way for the demonstration of the superiority of faith.56 While the sequential order is of
secondary importance to our argument, the continuity of themes reveals Huet’s view of
his own project. He perceived a unity between the Quaestiones and the Censura:
Each of these treatises, that in which I endeavored to conciliate reason and faith, and that
in which I oppugned the Cartesian philosophy, were part of a greater work which I had
planned in my mind and of which it will not be foreign to the purpose of this book to give
a sketch. 57

Thus, as was argued in the second chapter, Huet’s opposition to Descartes was motivated
largely by his opposition to Cartesian intellectual optimism in philosophy. Huet’s
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“greater work” could be interpreted as a skeptical fideistic project that culminated in the
Traité. Huet admitted that his “love and esteem” of ancient philosophy led him to study
ancient sects in depth. His studies, however, led him to express astonishment about and
disillusionment with philosophy:
And as this science [philosophy] is boundless, wandering into immensity beyond the
limits of time and creation, whilst the human mind, cooped within narrow bounds,
depressed to earth, and involved in thick darkness, attempts by the aid of its reason to
break forth into the light, and to seize upon the arduous summits of truth, I proposed to
enquire how high it could raise itself by its own powers and what aids were to be sought
for it from faith. These exalted studies long, much, and not unpleasantly, exercised my
mind and the accumulated product of my labors was swelling to a great bulk, when I
thought it would be more useful, and better accommodated to common understandings, if
it were divided into parts, and brought under certain head. 58

By “parts,” Huet was referring to the Censura, the Quaestiones, and the Traité, all of
which combined skeptical arguments with a fideistic outlook in opposition to the
increasingly rational and naturalistic current of seventeenth-century theology.
Although Huet perceived Descartes and the Cartesians as his main opponents and
wanted to remove natural reason from intervention in matters of religion, his project was
not widely appreciated, as reactions to the Traité in Huet’s correspondence reveal.
While Huet’s friends perceived the sincerity of his arguments, they disparaged
Huet’s fideism. Huet sent a manuscript of the Traité to his friend Charles de La Rue
(1643-1725), a preacher and orator at the Society of Jesus. He received a less than
favorable reply. De La Rue urged Huet to suppress the more shocking and controversial
parts of the treatise, warning of the potential “public fury” against Huet. 59 De La Rue also
predicted the reaction of Huet’s friends:
You will see the greater part of your friends either declaring against you or, at least, not
daring to defend you…You will say that I am afraid, and that one ought not fear for the
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truth! I will confess to you, I am afraid. But I will respond that this truth is not so
important that you, in its defense, must take on the whole world. 60

Such a reaction illuminates Huet’s reasons for not publishing the Traité and accurately
predicts the future outrage. Huet’s social standing and his friendships required a certain
amount of discretion with respect to religious controversies.
Pirot, the Sorbonne censor, was appalled by the work and troubled by the
consequences of Huet’s skepticism. He wrote that by claiming the impossibility of
attaining true and certain knowledge through natural reason, Huet “deprived Christian
apologists of an essential tool,” thereby undermining faith, not buttressing it. 61 For Pirot
and other Jesuits, Huet’s views were in direct opposition to their professional vocations
and roles.
Strictly speaking, Huet’s position was heretical because it stood in direct
opposition to the Fifth Lateran Council by claiming that reason could not demonstrate the
existence of God. Pirot and De La Rue did not doubt the sincerity of Huet’s religious
beliefs. On the other hand, they could not allow him to advertise his views openly, for
fear of a backlash. Thus, Huet’s intentions were understood but not widely supported.
When the Traité was finally published in 1723, it received much criticism from
Huet’s other friends and colleagues. Many claimed that Huet could not have written the
work, until Huet’s friend abbé Pierre-Joseph Thoulier d’Olivet (1682-1768) produced the
original manuscript in Huet’s hand. 62 Others were dismayed over the book’s content and
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distraught by its author’s conclusions. 63 It is difficult to know whether the expressed
reactions were sincere or feigned, given that Huet had circulated a manuscript of the
work among his friends.
D’Olivet defended Huet’s memory against the onslaught of criticism. He
explained the main arguments of the Traité and claimed that these arguments could have
been easily perceived in Huet’s earlier works. 64 He similarly suggested that there was
nothing irreligious in the Traité, as the opinions proposed therein did not contradict the
teachings of the Church. 65 He regretted that Catholic intellectuals had “treated such a
man as Huet like the world would treat a Bodin or a Spinoza” for having properly
identified faith as the God-given, and consequently infallible source of knowledge. 66
***
Huet’s pious intentions were shared by those who chastised his skeptical treatise.
His tactics, however, appeared excessively unconventional. Despite such a perception,
Huet’s fideistic skepticism presented one of the most orthodox reactions to the
naturalization of theology in the seventeenth century. Huet sought to convince his
contemporaries to abandon rational arguments concerning the existence of God and the
immortality of the soul and to accept these beliefs on faith alone. Reliance on faith was
the only thing that could, in Huet’s view, prevent the complete overthrow of orthodox
intellectual authorities.
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Although Huet denounced human reason, his humanist pursuits indicate that he
thought that some remnants of truth could be found in antiquity. For the modern reader,
he occupied the wrong place in the battle of ancients and moderns. Arguing that ancient
sources possessed significantly more value than modern ones ever could, Huet stood
against the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth century and doomed himself to
relative oblivion for the future. Huet is thus a tragic figure: he understood the dangers
presented by rationalism to traditional authorities, but he was disparaged for his efforts by
those who claimed to represent those very authorities. He was forgotten by modernity for
his orthodoxy, and censured by his friends for what they perceived as his heterodoxy. His
case sheds light on the tensions and the dilemmas of Catholicism in seventeenth-century
culture.
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Conclusion
The study of Huet’s thought is important to understanding the seventeenth century
and its intellectual climate. It demonstrates that seemingly contradictory intellectual
positions can be reconciled when they are considered historically. An historical analysis
that blends context with particular ideas expressed in that context reveals new details
regarding both each of these elements and their interrelationship. An investigation of
Huet’s publications in view of the intellectual world of seventeenth-century France sheds
light on the tensions between developments in natural philosophy and established
theological claims. Such a study provides a prism through which we are able to analyze
both disciplines more closely, revealing the nuanced relationship between the two in the
eyes of learned Europe.
While the thesis has demonstrated that Huet was not alone in his philosophical
and theological views, it remains difficult to establish how far the influence of fideistic
skepticism spread. Such beliefs may have often been concealed from public view, as with
Huet. Consequently, this thesis has demonstrated the methodological importance of using
unpublished sources. These have revealed crucial facts about Huet’s intellectual
development, allowing for the reinterpretation of his philosophy. Thus, it would be
interesting to substantiate further the pervasiveness of such beliefs by studying the views
of seventeenth and eighteenth century skeptics more meticulously than has been
previously done.
The continuity demonstrated in Huet’s intellectual development and scholarship
reveals the particular but historically revealing nature of his skeptical thought. Huet’s
case shows how a scholar of his background could have become disillusioned with the
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uncertainties that permeated the dogmatic philosophies of his time, and how such an
intellectual could have ultimately come to espouse skeptical philosophical positions that
rejected the human mind as a criterion of truth and certainty. This conversion, in its
deepest aims, maintained the goals of his Jesuit education. Huet, after all, was a Catholic
apologist who experienced an intellectual disillusionment with the methods of apologetic
works, but not with their purpose. He saw in fideistic skepticism the best defense of
revealed truths. Huet’s fideism aimed at moving supernatural questions away from the
scrutiny of natural philosophy.
In Descartes, Huet perceived the most dangerous and influential manifestation of
rationalism applied to supernatural religious truths. All philosophical attempts to prove
the existence of God were, in Huet’s mind, not only futile, but also enfeebling to the
faith. Thus, Huet’s philosophical and theological positions aimed to preserve traditional
authority from reexamination by the new philosophy of the scientific revolution. When
confidence in the powers of natural reason and in the human ability to know things with
certainty was on the rise, Huet thought he could oppose this intellectual current with
skeptical arguments.
It is ironic that the majority of Huet’s anti-Cartesian works were published after
Cartesianism had essentially won the intellectual struggle in France. His Censura
represents a desperate attempt to reveal the errors of Cartesianism. The Nouveaux
mémoires is a sarcastic work that, in its bitterness, acknowledged the loss to
Cartesianism. Huet’s Traité was thus the last attempt to dethrone Cartesian dogmatism.
Nonetheless, those who Huet believed should have supported him in the battle to
preserve the intellectual traditions of Catholic France chastised his skepticism. His Jesuit
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friends perceived his views to be perilous to their intellectual agenda, maintaining that
rational arguments were necessary for reinforcing the faith. His decision not to publish
the Traité signals his profound disappointment with the reactions of his colleagues. After
all, if his ideas were not supported in the Catholic community, they could not be used for
its defense.
Revealingly, Huet’s critics were not able to perceive that he could embody both a
commitment to philosophical skepticism and an insatiable quest for erudite knowledge.
This combination certainly makes Huet unique in his own right. Despite having
proclaimed the futility of attempting to know truths about the real world with certainty,
he continued to engage in extensive scholarly pursuits. Huet believed that the knowledge
of the divine, or at least wisdom, could be acquired through meticulous philological
investigations. At the same time, he conceded that this knowledge could not be certain.
Huet’s legacy is difficult to analyze because the Enlightenment appropriated most
skeptical arguments to serve its own anti-supernatural agenda. After the Enlightenment, it
became difficult to conceive of a combination of philosophical skepticism and religious
orthodoxy. This reinterpretation of Huet signals the need to reconsider the views of other
skeptics of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries regarding the relationship between
faith and natural reason.
Huet belongs to an understudied world of the opponents of Enlightenment and
pre-Enlightenment rationalism. Their arguments were eclipsed by the unprecedented
demonstrations of confidence in the human ability to know things with certainty. Huet’s
commitment to skepticism reveals his perception of the forthcoming revolutionary
changes in the conceptual understanding of philosophy, theology, and the appropriate
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relationship between the two. The analysis of the context, the evolution, and the nature of
his ideas sheds light on the historical implications of the dramatic transformation of
European thought in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.
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